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The Chernobyl Accident: A Case 
Study In International Law* 
Regulating State Responsibility for 
Transboundary Nuclear Pollution** 
Lmda A. Malone*** 
On Saturday April 26, 1986, at 1:23 a.m., the worst acCident m 
the htstory of nuclear energy1 began at the Chernobyl Nuclear 
Power Plant.2 In the fourth and newest reactor at the site, a cnsts 
of potentially catastroph1c proport1on started w1th a masstve loss 
of coolant m the reactor's core.3 The world did not know for 
months the precise sequence of events. The Chernobyl reactor 
was a graphite reactor generally considered to be an outmoded 
type of reactor which has been largely abandoned outstde the So-
viet Umon.4 The prevalent concern over use of graphite reactors 
even pnor to Chernobyl was m large part due to a fire which oc 
An abbreviated vers10n of th1s article was presented on September 30, 1986, at the 
Annual Meetmg m Plymouth, England of the Agncultural Law AssoCiation of Great Bntam 
and the ComJte Europeen de Drmt Rural. 
• • Trans boundary pollution may be defined as substance that ongmates m one 
nauon, moves through natural medium such as a1r or water, and 1mposes harmful effects 
m another nation. Comment, Ltability for Tran.mallonal Pollution Ans1ng from Offshore Oil 
Development: A Methodolog~cal Approach, 10 EcoLOGY L. Q 641 (1983). It has been 
suggested that pollution should not be defined to mclude any change m the environment, 
but to encompass "a threshold level of damage of interference whJCh IS legally s1gnificant. 
Sponger, Towards Meanmgful Concept of Pollut1on m InternatiOnal Law, 26 INT'L & CoMP L. 
Q 531, 532 (1977). 
••• AssoCiate Professor of Law, Umvers1ty of Arkansas Law School, Fayetteville; B.A. 
1975, Vassar College; J.D. 1978, Duke Law School; L.L.M. 1984, Umv. of Illino1s College 
of Law. 
I. After VISiting the Chernobyl plant, Hans Blix, Head of the International Atom1c En-
ergy Agency, stated, "It' clear that the radioactive consequences of th1s acCident also are 
more senous than any acCJdent so far, and also that radioactive releases to the atmosphere 
are far more senous. N.Y. Times, May 10, 1986, at AI, A4, col. 3. As of May 15, nme 
people had died and 299 others had been hospitalized for radiation s1ckness. Withm 19 
mile radius, 84,000 people were evacuated, some not until week after the acc1dent. A 
Fearful Flight from Chernobyl, NEWSWEEK, May 19, 1986, at 36. 
2. Barnathan & Strasser, Meltdown, NEWSWEEK, May 12, 1986, at 22 (heremafter 
Meltdown]. 
3. /d. at 23. 
4. /d. 
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curred m 1957 at Bntam s Windscale graphite reactor 5 How-
ever the acknowledged advantage from use of a graphite reactor 
IS Its utility m the productiOn of weapons-grade plutomum for nu-
clear weapons.6 
The Chernobyl reactor had a rudimentary emergency backup 
system. More significantly It had no contamment structure to 
control radioactive releases m the event of an accident. 7 The 
emergmg scientific consensus as to what occurred IS this: on Fn-
day April 25, for reasons mitially explamed by one Soviet official 
as "human error" 8 there was a failure m the water cooling system 
for the uramum fuel rods surrounded by graphite blocks.9 At a 
press conference m Moscow the Soviet Umon revealed that the 
accident was the result of an expenment designed to determme 
how long the reactor would contmue to produce electriCity m the 
event of an unexpected power cutoff.10 TechmCians deliberately 
lowered the reactor s power level and, most Importantly shut off 
the plant's emergency cooling system. 11 The operators, however 
contmued to let the reactor run with the emergency cooling sys-
tem turned off--a vwlatwn of Soviet safety protocols. 12 As a re 
sult, radioactive xenon gas built up and destabilized the fuel 
core.I 3 Compounding their error the techmcians removed all 
but a few of the control rods and disconnected the automatic rod 
control system. 14 From this pomt, the techmcians proceeded to 
go through a senes of steps to counterbalance the destabilized 
reactor until they eventually blocked the emergency water and 
pressure level wammg signals (that might have tnggered an auto-
matic shutdown for safety reasons) so that they could proceed 
with the expenment.15 Without proper coolant, the fuel rods 
were heated to a temperature of 3,500 degrees Fahrenheit, warp-
mg the zircomum alloy around the fuel assemblies. 16 At approxi-
5. /d. 
6. /d. For further discusston of the graphue reactor, see Sullivan, Calamzty Highlights Old 
Reactor- Deszgn Debate, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1986, at All, col. I. 
7 Meltdown, supra note 2, at 23. 
8. /d., N.Y Times, May 3, 1986, at A6, col. 3. 
9. Meltdown, supra note 2, al 23. 
10. Anatomy of Catastrophe, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1986, at 26 [heremafter Anatomy]. 
11. /d. 




16. N.Y. Times, May I, 1986, at All, cols. 1-2. 
1987] Chemobyl 205 
mately 5,100 degrees the uramum-oxide fuel Itself begms to 
melt. 17 Before this pomt, the reactor ordinarily would have 
flooded Itself with water and shut down automatically but this did 
not occur 18 
At 1 :23 a.m. on April 26, nevertheless, the expenment was be-
gun.l9 The operators shut off valves to prevent steam from 
reachmg the turbme umt they wanted to test. 20 Before domg so, 
they had bypassed the system that would have automatically made 
the reactor shut down.21 Withm seconds there was a heat and 
steam buildup m the core.22 Withm forty seconds, the shift man-
ager tned to stop the reactor but It was too late.23 The remam-
mg water m the system turned mto steam and reacted wtth the 
graphite, fuel and zircomum to produce flammable hydrogen 
methane and carbon monoxide.24 On Saturday April 26, at 1:23 
a.m., there were two gas explosiOns, blowmg the roof off the reac 
tor building.25 The resultant fire (with 100 foot high flames due 
to the lack of contamment26 from the then bummg graphite 
bncks), burned m the open air and released a cloud of smoke, 
gas, and radiat10n. 27 The fire would contmue to bum or smolder 
for at least a week.28 On Monday a worker at a nuclear power 
plant m Sweden walked past a radiatiOn detector and set off Its 
alarm. 29 After checkmg on Its own plant, Sweden discovered 
momtonng statiOns throughout the country were registenng un-
usually high levels of radiatiOn. 30 The radiation from Chemobyl 
that mittally swept over Norway Finland, and Sweden on April 
17 The Chernobyl Syndrome, NEWSWEEK, May 12, 1986, at 23 [heremafter Syndrome]. 
There IS disagreement over whether meltdown m the sense of penetration of the layer of 
concrete underneath the reactor occurred, but It was announced that the Soviet techm-
cians were trymg to entomb the building m concrete, lead, and boron, which would m-
clude laymg concrete underneath the reactor. A Fearful Flight, NEWSWEEK, May 19, 1986, at 
37-38. 
18. Syndrome, supra note 17 at 23. 
19. Anatomy, supra note 10, at 27 
20. !d. 
21. !d. 
22. !d. at 28. 
23. !d. 
24. Syndrome, supra note 17 at 23. 
25. Anatomy, supra note 10, at 28. 
26. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1986, at AI, col. 3. 
27 !d. at A6. 
28. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1986, at AI, cols. 4 & 6. 
29. Syndrome, supra note 17 at 24. 
30. !d. 
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28th was brought mto the heart of Europe by shifung wmds on 
May 5th.3 I By May 6, small amounts of radiatiOn had traveled 
across the Pacific Ocean and over much of the Umted States.32 
Pravda reported that helicopters were dumpmg sand, clay lead 
and boron mto the reactor to contam radioactivity 33 Diplomats 
were withdrawn from Moscow 34 tounsts returned home,35 
angmshed mothers m Poland fought over doses of Iodine for 
their children, sales of milk from grass-fed cows were banned,36 
and the European Commumty banned Imports of fresh food 
products from Eastern EuropeP As of the end ofjuly the Soviet 
Umon had 200 people suffermg from acute radiatiOn sickness and 
28 people dead as a result of the acCident.38 Surrounding the 
Chernobyl plant there was approximately 385 square miles that 
had been contammated and possibly a nearby water basm.39 
Outside of the Soviet Umon, European farmers sus tamed millions 
of dollars of damage from crops, livestock and dairy and egg 
products that could not be sold as a result of potential or actual 
contammat10n. 40 
The Chernobyl mCident bnngs mto focus the madequacy of do-
mestiC law to protect the global environment. PollutiOn and radi-
atiOn do not recogmze national boundanes. Any legal recourse 
for the damage mfiicted by the accident must come from mterna-
tionallaw 4 I As one notable mternatiOnallaw scholar has asked, 
"Should these decisions of such consequence for the future of the 
world and for humamty as a whole be left withm the provmce of 
natiOnal JUrisdictiOnal determmat10n?"42 
31. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1986, at A6, col. 1. 
32. /d. at col. 3. 
33. N.Y. Times, May 8, 1986, at AIO, col. I. 
34. Syndrome, supra note 17 at 29. 
35. /d. 
36. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1986, at All, col. 3. 
37 N.Y. Times, May 8, 1986, at AIO, col. 4. 
38. Chernobyl' Goal, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 1986, at 33. 
39. /d. 
40. Washmgton Post, June 8, 1986, at AI, col. 4. 
41. On mternauonal environmental law generally, see TECLAFF & UrroN, INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONNMENTAL LAw (1974) and A. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF POLLUTION 
(1983). 
42. Falk, The Global Envzronment and Internatzonal Law: Challenge and Response, 23 KAN. L. 
REV. 385, 403 (1975). 
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After the Chernobyl acCident, the Soviet Umon was 
threatened wtth a flurry of littgatwn.43 But potential and actual 
litigants soon discovered that although the Soviet Umon was cer 
tamly responsible for damage from the the acCident under mter 
natiOnal law recovery was uncertam and enforcement virtually 
Impossible. A global commumty that had often tgnored mterna-
twnal law was suddenly calling for Its expansiOn and enforce-
ment. The commumty asked, why are there not a global safety 
standards for nuclear reactors? Why are there not global early 
warnmg systems for nuclear acCidents? It asked why the Soviet 
Umon not obligated to pay compensatiOn for the damage caused 
by what the Soviet Umon Itself acknowledged was negligent oper 
atiOn of a nuclear reactor';) 
Conflicts over transboundary pollution are not recent develop-
ments. The semmal case m mternattonallaw governmg recovery 
for transboundary pollutiOn was decided m 1941 and was a har 
bmger of the present controversy over aCid ram.44 InternatiOnal 
law does provide rules of substantive liability for transboundary 
pollutiOn but enforcement Is hampered by and dependent upon 
state cooperatiOn. Utilizmg the Chernobyl acCident as a case 
study this article will focus on current mternatwnal law gov-
ernmg transboundary nuclear pollution, defiCienCies m the cur 
43. On May 15, the European Parliament called for the Sov1et Umon to pay compensa-
tion to Western European farmers. Xinhera General Overseas Serv1ce, May 16, 1986. On 
July 12, 1986, Oregon declared 1t would bill the Sov1et Umon $73,000.00 for the cost of 
radiation tests on a1r, water and vegetables. Los Angeles Times, July 12, 1986, at Al6, col. 
l. The Bntlsh Agnculture Mimster sa1d that consideration was bemg given to seekmg 
compensation, but there was hesitation because 1t m1ght set precedent for cla1ms agamst 
Great Bntam by Scandinavian countnes for aCid ram damage. Umted Press International, 
June 30, 1986, AM cycle. Swedish offiCJals studied the possibility of sumg Moscow for 
damages but sa1d It was unlikely they could do so. 1986 Reuters North European ServiCe, 
May 23, 1986 AM cycle. The West German government demanded that the Soviet Umon 
pay damages to the1r farmers because 1t was reqmred to pay Its farmers for damages under 
Its own domestic law; /d. A Belgian farmer declared he was gomg to sue the Soviet Umon 
h1mselffor $1500.00. Reuters North European Serv1ce, May 13, 1986, AM cycle. A Dutch 
msurance company h1red the International Legal Institute m the Hague to determme 
whether smt could be brought under Dutch, Sov1et or mternatlonallaw, and farmers m 
Italy and Austna urged the1r governments to bnng smts for agncultural damage. Associ-
ated Press, May 9, 1986, AM cycle. An Italian farmer sued the Sov1et Umon for $730.00 m 
damages man Italian court. Umted Press International, May 7 1986, PM cycle. Farmers 
m Northern England asked for compensation for lambs that could not be slaughtered and 
sold. Reuters North European Serv1ce, June 30, 1986, AM cycle. 
44. For an analysis of recent mternatlonal efforts to curb ac1d ram, see LaBastille,lnterna-
ltonal Acui Test, SIERRA, May-June 1986, at 51. 
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rent system, and necessary reforms to the system m light of 
"Chernobyl" 
I. LIABILITY FoR TRANSBOUNDARY PoLLUTION UNDER CusTOM 
AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 
Damages from Chernobyl, direct and mdirect, are difficult to 
quanttfy m monetary terms. The European Economic Commu-
mty s tmport ban on Polish food tmports cost Poland one million 
dollars m May of 1986 alone.45 Austnan farmers m June asked 
for nearly 5.5 million dollars m compensation from thetr own 
government for tts failure to exerctse enforcement control over 
vegetable sales.46 In May Italian farmers clatmed they were los-
mg 3.3 million dollars a day and the West German government 
estimated tts damages rntght be m the billions.47 
Any analysts of the Sovtet Umon s liability necessarily begms 
wtth the landmark Trail Smelter case. In the Trail Smelter case,48 
Canada and the Umted States, pursuant to a treaty specifically 
drafted for resolutton of the conflict, submitted a dispute con-
cermng emtsswns from a smelter near Trail, Canada for arbttra-
tton.49 The Umted States contended that sulfur dioxtde 
emtsstons from the smelter were crossmg the border and damag-
mg forests vttal to the lumber mdustry m the state of Washmg-
ton50 (sulfur dioxtde ts now generally acknowledged as the 
pollutant pnmarily responsible for the harmful effects of so-called 
aod ram). 51 In a 1938 mtenm declSlon, the arbttratwn tribunal 
concluded that there was InJury to the Washmgton forests and 
that the emtsstons from the Trail Smelter were the cause of that 
InJury 52 The tribunal then turned to the tssue of damages for 
that InJUry 53 In assessmg damages, the tribunal refused to allow 
damages for the wrong done the Umted States by Canada s vtola-
45. Reuters North European Servtce, May 13, 1986, AM cycle. 
46. Reuters North European Servtce, June 28, 1986, AM cycle. 
47 Assoctated Press, May 9, 1986. 
48. Trail Smelter Case (U. S. v. Canada), Aribttral Tribunal, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 
1905, 1938 (1949). 
49. /d. at 1917 
50. ld. at 1922. 
51. See SWEDEN'S CASE STUDY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN 
ENVIRONMENT, SUPPORTING STUDIES TO AIR POLLUTION ACROSS NATIONAL BoUNDARIES: 
THE IMPAGT ON THE ENVIRONMENT OF SULFUR IN THE AIR AND PRECIPITATION (1972). 
52. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards, at 1924. 
53. /d. at 1932. 
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tiOn of Its sovereigmty 54 The fact that pollutants from Canada 
had crossed the Umted States border did not tngger liability for 
damages without a showmg of matenal damage. In additiOn to 
those damages whtch were awarded for the InJUnes to the forests 
sustamed by the Umted States m the mtenm declSlon, the tribu-
nal ordered the Trail Smelter to refram from causmg further 
damage until Issuance of a final deCisiOn. 55 That final decisiOn 
was reported three years later and focused on whether the Cana-
dian Trail Smelter should be reqmred to refram from causmg 
damage m the future to the State of Washmgton.5 6 
The tribunal concluded that there was no need to determme 
whether Umted States domestic law or mternat10nallaw would be 
applied because the law followed m the Umted States m dealing 
wtth quasi-sovereign nghts of states Withm the Umted States m 
regulatmg air pollutiOn, while more defimte than mternat10nal 
law was m conformity with "the general rules of mternat10nal 
law " 57 Unable to find any precedents from mternat10nal tribu-
nals addressmg air or water pollutiOn, the tribunal turned to deCI-
siOns of the Umted States Supreme Court that were premised on 
the federal common law of nUisance. 5 8 From these cases adjudi-
catmg mterstate conflicts over air and water pollutiOn, the tribu-
nal concluded that "under the pnnciples of mternat10nal law as 
well as of the law of the Umted States, no State has the nght to 
use or permit the use of Its territory m such a manner as to cause 
mJury by fumes m or to the tern tory of another or the properties 
or persons therem, when the case IS of senous consequences and 
the InJUry Is established by clear and convmcmg evidence."59 Ac 
cordingly the tribunal found that Canada was legally responsible 
for the InJunous actions of the smelter under mternat10nal law 
and the smelter was reqmred to refram from causmg any further 
damage to the Umted States.60 
Two fundamental prmciples of mternat10nallaw may be drawn 
from the Trail Smelter declSlon. First, the Tribunal held that a 
state IS not entitled to legal relief merely upon a showmg that 
54. Jd. at 1932-33. 
55. /d. at 1934. 
56. ld. at 1962. 
57 /d. at 1964. 
58. Id. 
59. Jd. at 1965. 
60. /d. at 1948, 1966. 
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emissions or releases from one country have crossed mto the ter 
ntory of another state. There must be a showmg of matenal dam-
age over and above a vwlat10n of sovereigmty 61 Secondly a state 
may be held responsible for pollut10n by pnvate parties w1thm Its 
terntory if such polluuon results m demonstrable lllJUf)' to an-
other state or to the property or persons therem. 
Support for such a state obligatiOn may also be found outside 
the pollution context m the InternatiOnal Court of Justice deCI-
Sion m the Coifu Channel case.62 In that case, the Umted Kingdom 
sued Albama for physiCal damage and loss of life sus tamed by two 
Bntish warships which ran mto moored contact mmes m the 
Straits of Corfu.63 Although Albama was not found to have lam 
the mmes, the Court determmed that the laymg of the mmefield 
could not have been done Without Albama s knowledge.64 Hold-
mg Albama responsible for damages, the Court stated: 
The obligations mcumbent upon the Albaman authonties con-
sisted m notifymg, for the benefit of shippmg m general, the 
existence of a mmefield m Albaman terntonal waters and m 
warnmg the approachmg Bntish warships of the Immment dan-
ger to which the mmefield exposed them. Such obligations are 
based not on the Hague Convention of 1907 No. VIII, which Is 
applicable m time of war but on certam general and well-recog-
mzed pnnCiples, namely· elimmatmg consideratiOns of human-
Ity even more exactmg m peace than m war; the pnnCiple of 
the freedom mantime navigation and every State s obligatiOn 
not to allow knowmgly 1ts temtory to be used for acts contrary 
to the nghts of other States.65 
More than thirty years ago, both these cases recognized the rule 
of mternauonal law which says that permittmg extraterntonal 
damage from mtrastate activity which IS m and of Itselflawful (i.e., 
manufactunng, or operatmg nuclear power plants) may render 
the state responsible for the damage mflicted. In additiOn, PnnCI-
ple 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment 
m 1972 provided that states have an obligatiOn to ensure that ac 
tiVIties occurrmg Withm their JUrisdictiOn or under their control 
61. For an analysis emphasizmg the limited recovery permitted by the Trail Smelter 
case, see Rubm, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbttratwn, 50 OR. L. REv. 259 (1971). 
62. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albama), 1949 I.CJ. 4. 
63. /d. 
64. !d. at 20-22. 
65. !d. at 22-23. 
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do not cause harm m areas beyond their temtory 66 Principle 22 
reqmres states to cooperate m broadenmg liability for environ-
mental damage.67 As a result, the International Law Commission 
has smce been studymg proposals to extend national liability to 
cover InJUries caused by acts lawful per se.6s 
This reJeCtiOn of an absolute VIew of sovereignity69-that there 
are limitations on the lawful activities which may be conducted 
withm a state s own territory-may be characterized as the doc 
tnne of "abuse of rights" or the doctrine of "good neighborli-
ness." The source of these doctrines appear to stem from 
customary mtematiOnallaw general prinCiples oflaw (precepts of 
law recognized by most civilized nations) or more fundamentally 
from general doctrines of equity (ex aequo et bono).70 Under mter 
66. Stockholm Declaration of the Umted Natwns Conference on the Human Env1ronment, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.48/l4 (1972), repnnted m, II I.L.M. 1416 (1972). 
67 /d. at 1420. 
68. See, e.g., Second Report on lnternat1onal Lzability for hyunous Consequences Ansmg Out of 
Acts Not Prohib1ted by International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN 4/346, Add. I and Add. 2 (1981). 
See also Cooperatwn m the Field of the Env1ronment Concernmg Natural Resources Shared by Two or 
More States, G.A. Res. 3129, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 48-49, U.N. Doc. A/9030 
( 1973); Draft Pnnoples of Conduct m the Field of the Environment for the Guulance of States m the 
Conservation and Harmomous Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, Report 
of the Intergovernmental Workmg Group of Experts on Natural Resources Shared by Two or More 
States on the Work of its Fifth Sess1on, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.l2/2, at 9 (1978), and OECD Council 
Recommendation on Pnnoples Govern1ng Transfront~er Pollut1on, 14 I.L.M. 234 (1975) (requmng 
pnor nouce and mfonnauon about actions affectmg the shared resource); Sm1th, The 
OECD Approach to the Solut1on of the Transfront~er Pollut1on Problem m ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ASPECTS, A SYMPOSIUM (1976); see, e.g., Convention on 
Long Range Transboundary A1r Polluuon, Nov. 13, 1979, E/ECE/1010, T.I.A.S. No. 
1054; Wetstone and Rosencranz, Transboundary Air Pollution m Europe: A Survey of Nat1onal 
Responses, 9 CoLUM.J. ENVTL. L. I (1983). 
69. Traditionally states have had absolute sovereignty over use of natural resources 
w1thm the1r temtones. Permanent Soverezgnty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); Charter of Econom1c Rights and Dutus 
of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31), at 51; Stockholm Declaration of the 
Umted Nat1ons Conference on the Human Environment, supra note 66; see also Declamt1on on the 
Establishment of New International Economic Order G.A. Res. 320l(S-VI), 6th Spec1al SessiOn 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. l) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1954) and Programme of Actwn on the 
Establishment of New International EconomiC Order, G.A. Res. 3202(S-VI), 6th SpeCial Sess1on 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1), U.N. Doc. A/559 (1954). 
70. The accepted sources of internauonallaw are set forth m the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court ofjusuce, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 933: 
(l) The Court, whose funcuon 1s to dec1de m accordance with mtemauonallaw such 
disputes as are submitted to 1t, shall apply. 
(a) mternauonal convenuons, whether general or particular, establishmg rules ex-
pressly recogn1zed by the conceding states; 
(b) mternauonal custom, as ev1dence of general pracuce accepted as law; 
(c) the general pnnc1ples of law recognized by Civilized nauons; 
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national law the most controversial of these two doctrmes Is the 
concept of good neighborliness embodied m the latm maxim, szc 
utere tuo ut abenum non laedus: use your own property so that It will 
not lnJure others.7 1 
By havmg recogmzed the doctrme of good neighborliness, the 
Trail Smelter case mevitably raised many more questiOns than It 
answered. In analyzmg the mterrelatiOnship between terntonal 
sovereignity and transnatiOnal pollutiOn, acknowledgement of the 
doctrme fails to adequately delineate the parameters of state obli-
gatiOn. 72 When are the pollutmg actiOns of pnvate parties the 
responsibility of the State? How must causatiOn between action 
and InJury be established? Can state responsibility be established 
without fault, I.e., based on stnct liability for ultrahazardous activ-
Ities? For what types of InJUries may damages be rcovered? Is 
InJunctive relief, as well as damages, appropnate relief under In-
ternatiOnal law;> 
II. FAULT STRICT LIABIL1Y AND THE PARAMETERS 
OF GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS 
The doctrme of good neighborliness, as a general prmCiple of 
law recogmzed by civilized nations, draws from traditiOnal Anglo-
Amencan theones of tort law Tort law governmg land use, how-
ever may be predicated on fault-I.e., trespass, nmsance, negli-
gence or mtentiOnal torts-or on stnct liability for ultrahazardous 
activity 73 Can a State s responsibility for pollutiOn under mter 
national law be predicated only on fault, or may there be stnct 
liability for pollutiOn damages created by ultrahzardous actiVIties, 
such as the operatiOn of a nuclear power plant? 
(d) subject to the proviSions of Article 59, JUdicial deciSions and the teachmgs of 
the most h1ghly qualified publicists of the vanous nations, as subsidiary means; 
(2) Th1s provisiOn shall not preJudice the power of the Court to decide case ex aequo 
et bono, if the parties agree thereto. 
Although the Trail Smelter case was decided pursuant to treaty for resolution of that dis· 
pute, the Tribunal based Its determmauon of substantive liability on sources of 1ntema· 
uonal law aside from the treaty Itself. Article IV of the Compromise govemmg the case 
authonzed the Tribunal to apply "the law and practice followed m dealing With cognate 
questiOns m the Umted States of Amenca as well as mtemauonallaw and practice. 3 R. 
Int'l Arb. Awards at 1908. 
71. Elkmd, Footnote to the Nuclear Tests Cases: Abuse of Right -A Blind Alley for Envrronmen-
talists, 9 YAND.j. TRANSNAT'L. L. 57 90-91 (1976). 
72. Hand!, Temtonal Soverezgnty and the Problem ofTransnatzonal Pollutron, 69 AM.J. INT'L L. 
50 (1975). 
73. See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS, §§ 13-15, 28-34, 86-91 (5th ed. 1984). 
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As early as 1966, C. WilfredJenks, Citmg treaties governmg avi-
ation hazards and nuclear damage,'4 argued that there was "a 
growmg number of significant exceptiOns to the alleged pnnCiple 
that liability m mternat1onal law rests exclus1vely upon fault." 
Jenks, however went on to questiOn whether such treaty obliga-
tions embody a nasCient rule of customary mternatwnal law Im-
posmg stnct liability for ultrahazardous actiVIty or exceptions by 
treaty to an established custom requmng fault for state liability 75 
Focusmg on treaties governmg nuclear damage, Jenks set forth 
the followmg pnnCiples for state responsibility· 
The pnnCiple that liability for nuclear damage IS "absolute" 1s 
generally accepted but the expressiOn 1s somewhat m1sleading 
m that 1t does not exclude the possibility of exceptiOns. The 
pnnCiple that such liability by reason of 1ts potential scale, 
must rest upon a responsible operator who remams responsi-
ble while nuclear matenal 1s m the hands of mtermedianes 1s 
likew1se generally accepted. 
• • • 
For both pollution and nuclear hazards, 1t 1s the scale of the 
possible consequences whiCh converts the ultrahazardous use 
of a facility mvolvmg the liability of the operator mto the ul-
trahazardous use of a terntory mvolvmg the liability of the 
State. Fundamentally the questiOn 1s of public policy 76 
One commentator also relymg on the general pnnciples of 
law has attempted to distmgmsh between the doctnnes of abuse 
of nghts and good neighborliness. Pursuant to the doctrme of 
good neighborliness, a property owner 1s bound to accept a rea-
sonable amount of nOise, smoke, and other pollution, but when 
that mvaswn or trespass exceeds that reasonably necessary then 
the InJUred neighbor may seek a legal rememdy to prevent the 
mterference, or seek damages.77 Fault m the form of maliCious or 
74. Jenks, Liability for Ultra-Hazardous ActiVIties m International Law, 117 HAGUE RECUEIL 
99, 106 (1966-1). 
75. Id. 
76. /d. at 127 144-45. It should also be noted that the Restatement of Fore•gn Rela-
uons Law has reJeCted absolute liability for environmental damage: 
(i) A State 1s obligated to take such measures as may be practicable under the Cir-
cumstances to ensure that actlVJtles Wlthm 1ts junsdictlon or control 
(a) conform to generally accepted mtematlonal rules and standards for the preven-
tion, reducuon, and control of illjury to the environment of another state or of areas 
beyond the limits of natural JUnsdicuon; 
(b) are conduted so as not to cause significant InJUry to the environment of another 
state or of areas beyond the limns of national JUnsdictlon. 
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 601(1) (1983). 
77 Elkmd, supra note 71, at 91. 
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negligent conduct IS not necessary for liability but Is relevant to 
whether or not the mvas10n was reasonable. 78 Abuse of nghts 
occurs when activity IS motivated by culpable behavior such as 
maliCious mtent or negligence. When a property owner harms his 
neighbor by land uses which do not necessarily physically mvade 
the neighbor's property or cause an unreasonable mterference, 
the only theory for relief IS abuse of nghts predicated on negli-
gence or malioous mtent. 79 Under this formulatiOn of the two 
doctnnes, the conclusiOn reached Is that the doctnne of good 
neighborliness IS the theory for recovery m the Trail Smelter case 
because no showmg of maliciOus mtent or negligence was 
made.80 
To summanze bnefly the extant theones of state liability for 
transboundary pollutiOn drawmg on custom, general pnnoples of 
law and eqmty It may be postulated that: 
1. A State has an absolute duty to protect agamst transatiOnal 
harm from ultrahazardous activity conducted w1thm Its tern-
tory and IS stnctly liable for any resultant damage. 
2. A State has a duty to use reasonable care to protect States 
agamst extraterntonal harm from acts committed w1thm Its ter 
Itory and failure to do so renders the State responsible for 
damage mcurred as a result of negligence or mtentwnal harm. 
3. A State IS liable if It permits trans boundary pollutiOn from 
w1thm Its terntory to exceed that which Its neighbors may be 
reasonably expected to endure. 
Of these theones, stnct liability appears to be the most tenuous. 
Recovery under the other two theones, however will depend 
largely upon a balancmg of factors to determme the reasonable-
ness of the mvas10n or the reasonableness of precautions taken by 
the state. 
Traditionally under mternauonallaw attributmg state respon-
sibility for the conduct of pnvate parties has focused on whether 
there IS a nexus between the state and pnvate conduct sufficient 
to render the state ongmally accountable to another state for repa-
rations. Such responsibility has traditiOnally been predicated on 




81. See generally Kelson, State Responsibility and the Abnonnally Dangerous Act1v1ty, 13 HARV. 
INT'L L. J. 197 199 (1972). The author concludes that: "(I) Where the nsk of harm from 
an act1v1ty 1s substantial m either probability or magmtude of harm, and IS transnational m 
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uonal Law CommiSSion, for example, largely reflect this tradi-
tional focus. 8 2 This limited focus fails to provide cntena for 
determmmg when a state IS under an mtemat10nal obligation to 
prevent unreasonable nsk of harm to other states through meas-
ures regulatmg health, safety and secunty Thus, "admittmg even 
the possibility that a state may act when It fails to regulate or con-
trol pnvate activity Is to move m a substantive directiOn. "83 In 
short, there has been relatively little refinement of when a state Is 
vzcanously liable for acts of persons withm Its borders, and of what 
the nature of that liability ts. Yet under the doctnne of good 
neighborliness and stnct liability for ultrahazardous actiVIties, the 
state Is not only liable If It IS the operator of the plant but IS also 
ongznally liable for the harm if an unreasonable Interference or 
harm from an ultrahazardous actiVIty IS demonstrated, regardless 
of whether fault (in the sense of mtent, recklessness or negli-
gence) IS shown. 
character, the State wtthm whose JUnsdicuon the acuvtty ts conducted ts under duty to 
prevent such harm as may be caused by the enterpnse; (2) State ts under duty to notify 
any other State whtch may be threatened by harm from the abnormally dangerous actlvt-
ues whtch the State permits to be conducted wtthm Its JUnsdicuon; and [less Importantly] 
(3) State, failing to prevent harm, shall be ongmally responsible and stnctly liable for the 
harm caused by abnormally dangerous acuvtues wtthm Its JUnsdicuon to the rest dents or 
property of another State. !d. at 242-43. 
82. Draft Artzcles on State Responsibility, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) 187 U.N. Doc. 
A/33/10 (1979), repnnted m, [1978] 2 Y.B. INT'L. L. CoMM'N 78, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/l978/Add.l (Part 2). 
The relevant article for state responsibility for mtemauonal pollution IS Arttcle 3: 
There IS an mtenuonally wrongful act of State when: 
(a) conduct conststmg of an action or ommtsswn ts attributable to the State under 
mternauonal law; and 
(b) that conduct constitutes breach of an mtematwnal obligation of the State. 
/d., art. 3. For htstory of the article m relauon to transboundary polluuon, see Hand!, 
Temtonal Soveretgnty and the Problem of Transboundary Pollutwn, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 50, 58-60 
(1975). 
The International Law Commtsston has been studymg the law of state responsibility and 
has affirmed the "prmople that States, even when undertakmg acts that mtemauonal law 
[does] not prohibit [have] duty to constder the mterests of other States that mtght be 
affected. Draft Artzcles on State Responsibility, supra, at 159. 
Similarly, the International Law Assooatton m 1982 adopted Rules oflnternational Law 
Applicable to Transfront1er Pollution. Article 3(1) declares: "States are m thelr legmmate 
activities under an obligation to prevent, abate and control transfrontier pollution to such 
an extent that no substantial mJunes caused are m the tern tory of another State. INT'L 
LAw Ass'N, REPORT OF THE SIXTIETH CoNNFERENCE HELD AT MoNTREAL 160 (1983). Signifi-
cantly, the comments to the rules state that the rules merely restate mternationallaw as It 
extsts. !d. at 158. 
83. Chnstenson, The Doctnne of Attributwn zn State Responsibility, m INT'L LAw OF STATE 
RESONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS: SELECTED CONTEMPORARY ISSUES (R. Lillich ed.). 
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An additional theory which may be utilized to reqmre States to 
abstam from pollutmg the global environment 1s the public trust 
doctnne. The concept of protection of the public trust, property 
mterests that belong to the public m general, 1s fundamental m 
the domestic law of many countnes. It may therefore be consid-
ered a general pnnCiple of law under InternatiOnal law 84 The 
public trust doctnne IS especially relevant to protectiOn of com-
munal global resources not withm any particular state s Junsdic 
tiOn-for example, the high seas. The concept IS ImpliCitly 
recogmzed m the Stockholm Declarat10n85 and other resolutiOns 
of global environmental policy 86 which supports Its recogmtiOn 
as customary InternatiOnal law Along with the responsibility to 
abstam from InJurmg the global environment, a state may have an 
obligatiOn and standing as parens patnae to obJect to other states' 
destructiOn of shared global resources.8 7 
84. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctnne m Natural Resource Law: EffectlvejudiCUJl lnterventzon, 
68 MicH. L. REv. 475, 484-85 (1970); Nanda, The Establishment of Internatzonal Standards for 
Transnational Environmental Injury, 60 IowA L. REv. 1089, 1118 (1975); and Tiewul, Interna-
tional Law and Nuclear Test Explos1ons on the High Seas, 8 CoRNELL INT'L LJ. 45, 68 (1974). 
85. Stockholm DeclaratiOn of the Umted Nat1ons Conference on the Human Environment, supra 
note 66. Pnne~ple I states that "[m]an bears a solemn responsibility to protect and 
zmprove the envzronment for present and future generations; PnnCJple 2 provzdes that 
"(t]he natural resources of the earth mcluding the azr, water, land, flora and fauna. must 
be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planmng 
and management. !d. at 1418. See also Sohn, The Stockholm Declaratzon on the Human Envi-
ronment, 145 HARV INT'L LJ. 423 (1973); The World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7 37 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 17 U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982). 
86. See, e.g., Unzted Nat1ons Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 62/122 
(1982), repnnted m 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) and Agreement Governmg the ActiVItii!S of States on the 
Moon and other Celest1al Bodies, G.A. Res. 34/68, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 77 U.N. 
Doc. A/34/46, art. 11 (declanng certam natural resources to be the common hentage of 
mankmd). See also The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780; 
Treaty on PnnCJples Govemmg Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies, Jan. 27 1967 U.S.-Bntam-Russza, 18 U.S.T 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 610 
U.N.T.S. 205; Resolut1on on the Quest1on of the Reservatron Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of the 
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Underlyzng the High Seas Beyond the Lrmrts of 
Natzonaljunsdictzons, and the Use ofThl!lr Resources m the Interests of Mankznd, G.A. Res. 2574 D 
(XXIV), 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. {No. 30) 11, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1970), repnnted zn, 9 I.L.M. 
422 (1970); and Declaration of Pnnctples Governzng the L1m1ts of Natzonaljurndictzon, G.A. Res. 
2749 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. {No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), repnnted m, 10 
I.L.M. 220 (1971). 
87 Wezss, The Planetary Trust: Conservatwn and Intergenerat1onal EqUity, 11 EcOLOGY L.Q 
495, 540-41 (1984). The author further contends that not only should the fiduczary obli-
gation to protect "the planetary trust" be regarded as customary mtemauonal law, but 
also as JUS cogens, preemptory norm whzch m theory State could enforce before the 
International Court of Jusuce. /d. at 540-41. The author concedes, however, that "it zs 
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Assummg for the moment that the InJUred state can make the 
reqmsite showmg of fault, unreasonable mterference or stnct lia-
bility that state, under mtemauonal law will face many of the 
hurdles to relief that a tort plamtiff encounters under traditiOnal 
Anglo-Amencan tort law The state will have to demonstrate ma-
tenal damage, although the full health and socroeconomrc conse 
quences of pollutron may not be demonstrable until years after 
the ongrnal mfticuon of the InJury It must also be demonstrated 
that the damage sustamed was caused by pollution from sources 
m the challenged state. 88 Given the mteractiOn of pollutants and 
the lengthy latency penod for many diseases, rt may be difficult or 
rmpossible to demonstrate, for example, that emrssrons from a 
source Am State B caused cancer m resrdents of State C.89 
Even if the prereqmsrtes for liability are established, and mate 
nal damage Is proven, full relief may not be readily available. 
One suggestion IS that damages for transboundary pollution 
under mtematronallaw mclude compensation for loss or damage 
to an mdivrdual's property mcluding loss of an exrstmg tangible 
asset and temporary or permanent loss of Its use, personal InJUry 
and damage consequent upon death. Survivors are thus enabled 
"to obtam compensation for financral loss they may suffer when 
the vrctim provided for their support."90 On the other hand, eco-
nomrc loss rs ordinarily not recoverable, although vanous declara-
tions, resolutions and conventrons on pollutron mclude recovery 
for such loss.91 Psychologrcal damage or emotional distress must 
also be consrdered as a form of damages which may or may not be 
recoverable.92 With regard to transboundary pollutron there rs a 
trend toward wrdenmg the range of compensable damage while 
limitmg the amount of liability 9 3 
An entrrely separate remedial Issue IS whether a state may con-
tmue to permit conduct for whrch It rs liable m damages, or 
whether prospective InJunctive relief would be appropnate whiCh 
hard to establish that [such an obligation] already exists as part of customary mternauonal 
law. !d. at 542. 
88. See Hand), supra note 72, at 75, n.I57 
89. See, e.g., Kelson, supra note 81, at 238-242. 
90. Pontavice, Compmsatwnfor Transjront1er PollutiOn Damage, m LEGAL AsPECT OF TRANS· 
FRONTIER PoLLUTION 409 (Orgamzauon of Economic Cooperation and Development 
1977). See also RESTATEMENT OF fOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 602 (1983). 
91. /d. 
92. /d. 
93. !d. at 485. 
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reqmres the state to discontmue the harmful conduct. In a semi-
nal article on the Umted States atomte weapon tests m 1954 m 
the Pacific Provmg Grounds, McDougal and Schlet, wntmg m 
1960, noted: 
No mternational tribunal has yet uneqmvocally faced the ISsue 
whether a state may contmue to carry on conduct for which It Is 
liable m damages, but sound policy decrees that mternational 
law should parallel mumcipal law m this respect. Although no 
legal Issues were formally resolved between Japan and the 
Umted States, the settlement m fact reached a desirable legal 
result. Japan explicitly refused to demand that the Umted 
States discontmue Its tests, and the Umted States paid two mil-
lion dollars m damages Without reference to questions of legal 
liability Only third parties, unembarrassed by responsibilities 
for the defense and secunty of the free world, seem unable to 
precelVe the need for an appropnate discnmmat10n between 
remedy for damage and mutual tolerance for VItal mterests.94 
McDougal and Schlei's analysts, however ts troubling m several 
respects. The traditiOnal "balancmg of the eqmttes" for InJUnc 
ttve relief under mumctpal law has been demonstrated to under 
value environmental concerns. In the gmse of protectmg the 
"public's mterest" Umted States courts, for example, have often 
shown an unwillingness to order cessat10n of mcome producmg, 
yet pollutmg facilities.95 When faced with unemployment and 
loss of mcome that Is easily measured, balancmg the equities 
tends to Ignore the Importance of clean air and water good 
health, and aesthetiC values which are not readily reduced to 
monetary value. In the gmse of "the defense and secunty of the 
free world," McDougal and Schlei would similarly strike the bal-
ance m favor of military and strategtc supenonty at the expense 
of the global environment. Their approach also runs counter to a 
growmg awareness that war IS the greatest threat to the environ-
ment and that national secunty encompasses environmental 
secunty 96 
94. McDougal and Schle1, The Hydrogtm Bomb Tests m PerspectiVe: Lawful Measures for Secur-
tty, 64 YALE L.J. 648, 694-95, (1955). 
95. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlanuc Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 257 
N.E.2d 870 (1970). 
96. Treaues restnctmg nuclear weapons and other weapons threatenmg environmental 
destrucuon mclude: Treaty Banmng Nuclear Weapons Tests m the Atmosphere, m Outer 
Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T 1313, T.l.A.S. No. 5433; Treaty on 
PrmCiples Govemmg the AcuviUes of States m the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 86; Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons m Latin Amenca (Treaty ofTiatelolco), Feb. 14, 1967 634 U.N.T.S. 
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Ill. TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION OF THE GLOBAL COMMONS 
Transboundary pollutiOn which contammates the ocean 
presents Its own umque Issues of environmental protectiOn under 
mternatiOnal law 97 The four Geneva Conventions of 1958 took 
only a prelimmary step toward environmental protectiOn of the 
oceans.98 Part VII of the Law of the Sea ConventiOn more specifi-
cally governs protection and preservation of the marme environ-
ment, mcluding enforcement of the ConventiOns reqmrement.99 
281, repnnted m, 61.L.M. 521 (1967); Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839; Treaty on the Prohibition of the Implace-
ment of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the 
Ocean Floor and m the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337· 
Convention on Prohibition of the Development Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteno-
logtcal (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 
U.S.T 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062; Conventwn on the Prohib1t1on of Military or Any Other Hostile Use 
of Environmental ModificatiOn Techmques, G.A. Res. 31/72, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 
36, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976); see also Weiss, supra note 87 at 556-57· Resolut1o11 Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction tn Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1884 (XVIII), 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 15) at 13, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964), repnnted m, 2 I.L.M. 1192 (1963). 
97 For analysis of state' obligation to prevent environmental damage to Interna-
tional watercourses, see Carvell, The North Dakota Garnson Diverswn Project and /nternatwnal 
Environmental Law, 60 N.D.L. REv. 603 (1984). 
98. The Convention on the Contmental Shelf, April 29, 1958, art. 5(7), 1 U.S.T 471, 
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 331, makes protection of the livmg resources of the h1gh 
seas from "harmful agents mandatory for all coastal states. 
The ConventiOn on the Tern tonal Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, art. 24 
(l), 2 U.S.T 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, provides: 
ln zone of the h1gh seas contlguous to 1ts terntonal sea, the coastal State may exer-
Cise the control necessary to: 
(a) prevent the mfnngement of Its samtary regulations wllhm Its tern tory or 
temtonal sea; 
(b) pumsh mfrmgement of the above regulations commllted w1thm Its terntory or 
temtonal sea. 
The Convention on Fishmg and Conservation of the L1vmg Resources of the High Seas, 
April 29, 1958, art. 7 I U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 599 U.N.T.S. 285, allows any 
coastal state to adopt unilateral measures of conservation appropnate to any stock of fish 
or other manne resources m an area of the h1gh seas adjacent to Its temtonal sea, if such 
measures are not arnved at through negotiations with other mterested states w1thm six 
months. 
The Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, art. 24, 13 U.S.T 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 
5200,450 U.N.T.S. 82, reqmres States to draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the 
seas by the discharge of oil from sh1ps or p1pe\ines or resu\tmg from the exp\mtallon or 
exploration of the seabed and Its subsoil, takmg account of ex1stmg prov1s1ons on the 
subJect, and similarly art. 25 reqmres the takmg of measures to prevent pollution of the 
seas from the dumpmg of radioactive wastes, "takmg mto account any standards and regu-
lauons wh1ch may be formulated by the competent mtemational orgamzations of the 
seas or a1r space above, resultmg from any radioactive matenals or other harmful agents. 
99. Umted Natwns Conventwn on the Law of the Sea, supra note 86. Art. 194 requires states 
to take all necessary measures to prevent pollution of the manne environment, mcluding 
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In recent years there have been numerous multilateral conven-
tions restnctmg pollutiOn of the seas, 100 such as those m Pnnci-
ples 6, 7 and 26 of the Stockholm Declarat10n. 10 1 It has been 
postted by more than one commentator that "what was once an 
the prevention of releases of toXIC, hannful and nox1ous substances from land-based 
sources, from or through the atmosphere, and by dumpmg. Under art. 198, state whiCh 
becomes aware of cases m wh1ch the manne environment 1s m 1mmment danger of bemg 
damaged or has been damaged by polluuon shall Immediately notify other States It deems 
likely to be affected by such damage, as well as the competent mtemauonal orgamzauons, 
global or regwnal. Arts. 207 to 211 reqmre states to establish laws to control pollution 
from land-based sources, seabed actlvltles, dumpmg, and from vessels. Art. 212 prov1des: 
l. States shall, w1thm a1r space under the1r sovere1gn1ty or with regard to vessels or 
a1r craft ftymg the1r flag or of the1r reg1stry, establish national laws and regulations to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the manne environment from or through the 
atmosphere, takmg mto account mtematlonally agreed rules, standards and recom-
mended pract\Ces and procedures, and the safety of atr navtgatton. 
2. States shall also take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and 
control such pollution. 
3. States, actmg m particular through competent mtematlonal orgamzatlons or dip-
lomatic conference shall endeavor to establish global and reg1onal rules, standards 
and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control pollution 
of the manne environment from or through the atmosphere. 
100. 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by 
Oil, July, 1958, 3 U.S.T 2989, T.l.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3; 1962 Amendments to 
the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by the Sea by Oil, May 18, 1967 2 
U.S.T 1523, T.l.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332; 1969 Amendments to the 1954 Con-
vention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil, annexed to IMCO Assembly 
Res. A. 175(vi), Oct. 21, 1969; lntemauonal Convent1on Relatmg to Intervention on the 
High Seas m Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969, Brussels, repnnted m, 9 
l.L.M. 25 (1970); lntemauonal Convenuon on Civil Ltability for Oil PoUuuon Damage, 
Nov. 29, 1969, Brussels, repnnted m, 9 l.L.M. 45 (1970); Agreement Concemmg Pollution 
of the North Sea Oil, June 9, 1969, 704 U.N.T.S. 3, repnnted m, 9 I.L.M. 359 (1970); Con-
vention Relatmg to Civil L1ability m the Field of Mantlme Carnage of Nuclear Matenal, 
Dec. 17 1971, repnntedm, 11 I.L.M. 277 (1972); Convention on the Establishment ofan 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, repnnted m, 
II l.L.M. 284 (1972); Convenuon for the Prevention of Manne Pollution by Dumpmg 
from Sh1ps and A1rcraft, Feb. 15, 1972, repnnted m, II I.L.M. 262 (1972); ConventiOn on 
the PreventiOn of Manne Pollution by Dumpmg of Wastes and Other Matter, Nov. 13, 
1972, 26 U.S.T 2403, T.l.A.S. No. 8165, repnnted m, 11 l.L.M. 1294 (1972); International 
Convention for the Preventwn ofPolluuon from Sh1ps, Nov. 2, 1972, repnnted m, 12I.L.M. 
1319 (1973), (Nordic) Convention on Environmental Protection, Feb. 19, 1974, repnnted 
m, 13 I.L.M. 591 (1974); Convention for the Prevention of Manne Pollution from Land 
Based Sources, Feb. 16, 1976, repnnted m, 15 l.L.M. 290 (1976). 
101. Stockholm DeclaratiOn of the Umted Natzons Conference on the Human Environment, supra 
note 66. Pnnople 6 states: 
The discharge of tox1c substances or of other substances and the release of heat, m 
such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of the env1ronment to 
render them harmless, must be halted m order to ensure that senous or Irreversible 
damage IS not mfticted upon ecosystems. The JUSt struggle of the peoples of all coun-
tnes agamst polluuon should be supported. 
Pnnople 7 prov1des: 
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mchoate doctrme of "pollutiOn" m mternatiOnal law has smce 
evolved mto a coherent and bmding prmciple of customary mter 
nauonal law or at the very least, mto a general pnnCiple of law 
recogmzed by cwilized natlons." 102 Histoncally however waters 
wtthm the temtonal JUnsdiction of a natiOn, state or states were 
presumed to be solely withm their control, and mternat10nal wa-
ters were presumed to be outside the control of any natiOn 
state. 103 The 1982 ConventiOn of the Law of the Sea has been 
heralded as possibly enunCiatmg a general prmciple of state re-
sponsibility and liability for InJUry to the manne environment. 104 
Most mternatiOnal law scholars now take the positiOn that cus-
tomary mternatwnallaw provides that all natiOns share responsi-
bility to protect the ocean areas beyond their temtones, which 
mcludes an obligatiOn to control their Citizens to assure such 
protectwn.105 
The Trail Smelter case s emphasis on matenal damage to the ter 
ntory of another state may be seen as a limitatiOn on recovery for 
damage to shared global resources, but IS perhaps more appro-
pnately seen as a decision simply limited to the Issue ·of damage 
presented m the arbitratiOn as no Issue of InJury to the global 
common resources was alleged. 106 In the Nuclear Test Cases, 107 
States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that 
are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm livmg resources and marme life, 
to damage amemtles or to mterfere with other legitimate uses of the sea. 
PnnCiple 26 focuses on the harmful effects of nuclear weapons: 
Man and h1s environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other 
means of mass destruction. States must stnve to reach prompt agreement, m the rele-
vant mternauonal organs, on the elimmauon and complete destruction of such 
weapons. 
See a/so RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw§§ 611-612 (1983). 
102. Tiewul, supra note 84, at 55; compare McDougal & Schle1, supra note 94 (argumg 
that freedom of the h1gh seas mcludes the freedom to conduct nuclear weapons tests); and 
Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Expmments and lnternatwnal Law, 64 YALE LJ. 629 ( 1955). Re 
cently, many nations have JOmed together to develop standards to control pollutiOn m 
mutually shared seas, such as the Baltic, the Meditteranean, and the North Seas. See 
Keches, Regwnal Seas: An Emerg~ng Manne Policy Approach, m CENTER FOR OcEAN MANAGE-
MENT STUDIES, CoMPARATIVE MARINE Poucv at 17-20 (1981). 
103. Belsky, Management of Large Manne Ecosystems: Dcvelopmg New Rule of Customary 
/nternatwna/ Law, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 733, 734-742 (1985). 
!04. Hargrove, Environment and the Th1rd Conference of Law of the Sea, m WHo PROTECTS 
THE OcEAN? 191, 208 (J. Hargrove ed. 1975). There has been considerable debate over 
whether the rules m the 1982 Convention are customary law. Belsky, supra note 103, at 
753, n.96. 
!05. /d. at 751-53. 
!06. Rubm, supra note 61, at 279-81. 
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the InternatiOnal Court of Justice was directly presented wtth the 
tssue of recovery for environmental damage to the htgh seas, but, 
unfortunately dismissed the case as moot. When the French 
Government mdicated 1t would conduct no further atmosphenc 
tests of nuclear weapons m the Pacific Ocean, the Court held the 
cases to be moot and demed the request for a declaratory judg-
ment.108 Yet pnor to dismtssal, the Court had tssued an Intenm 
Order of Protection under Arttcle 41 of the Statute of the Interna-
tiOnal Court of JustiCe upon a finding of pnma Jane JUnsdictton. 109 
In a stmilar controversy the Umted States settled ex gratza 
(wtthout reference to liability) a clatm from Japan for lllJUry to a 
Japanese fishmg vessel and fishermen caught m the radioactive 
fallout from an Amencan nuclear test m the Pacific Ocean. 110 In 
the Fukuryu Maru affair the Umted States patd Japan two million 
dollars m compensatiOn for the damages sustamed, mcluding m-
JUnes to the tuna fish mdustry m Japan. 111 It may certamly be 
concluded that the settlement reflected opmw JUrtS that the settle-
ment was legally compelled. 112 The Items of damage, however 
did not mclude fish rendered radioactive m the ocean except to 
the extent they were later caught by Japanese fishermen and, 
thus, constituted economic mJury to Japanese mterests. 113 
The speCial and potentially catastrophiC problem of radioactive 
fallout ments separate analysts, m that radioacttve fallout from 
weapons tests may also vtolate the Partial Test Ban Treaty 114 
107 Nuclear Test Cases (Australia v. France) 1973 I.CJ. 99 and (New Zealand v. 
France) 1973 I.C.J. 135. 
108. Nuclear Test Cases (Australia v. France) 1974 I.CJ. 253 and (New Zealand v. 
France) 1974 I.CJ. 457 
109. 1973 I.CJ. 99, 102; and 1973 I.CJ. 135, 138. See also Elkmd, French Nuclear Testmg 
and Artzcle 41 -Another Blow to the Authonty of the Court?, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 39 
(1974). 
110. Rubm, supra note 61, at 279. 
Ill. /d. 
112. /d. In the Umted States, the authonty under whiCh ex grat1a settlements were made 
to forergn clarmants by the Executive was generally limited to mentonous" clarms. 10 
U.S.C. § 2734 (1964); 22 U.S.C. § 2669(b) (Supp. I, 1965-66); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2672, 2674 
(1964); but see McDougal & Schier, supra note 94. 
l\3. Rubm, supra note 6\, at 280. 
114. Treaty Banmng Nuclear Weapon Tests m the Atmosphere, m Outer Space and 
Under Water, supra note 96. A full analysrs of whether nuclear weapons tests, parucrpauon 
m the nuclear arms race, or use of nuclear weapons vwlated mternatronal law 1s beyond 
the scope of th1s arucle. Bnefly, however, rt should be mentroned that the Statute of the 
InternatiOnal Atomrc Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, art. 2 and 3, 8 U.S.T 1093, T.I.A.S. 
No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3, prohibrts the use of any specral fissronable and other matenals, 
servrces, eqmpment, facilities or mformauon made available by the Agency or at rts re-
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The Partial Test Ban Treaty prohibits states from nuclear explo-
sions m the atmosphere; beyond their terntones, mcluding outer 
space; underwater mcluding terntonal waters on high seas, or m 
any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debns 
to be present outside the terntonal limits of the State under 
whose JUnsdiction or control such explosiOn IS conducted.l 15 If 
the Partial Test Ban Treaty IS evidence of customary mtemat10nal 
law then any nuclear actiVIty resultmg m radioactive fallout 
outside the State s terntory may violate customary mternat10nal 
law Without further reference to any other rules of mtemat10nal 
law governmg pollutiOn generally 116 
quest or under 1ts supervlSlon or control m such way as to further any military purpose. 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T 483, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, forb1ds "non-nuclear states" (states other than the 
People' Republic of Chma, France, the Umted States, the Sov1et Unwn, and the Umted 
Kingdom) from manufactunng or otherwise acqumng nuclear weapons or nuclear explo-
Sive devJCes. It may be argued that the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty have now become customary mtematlonallaw, and that they together w1th numer-
ous U.N. resolutions mdicate customary mternatlonal law opposed to the acqmslllon, 
development, detonation and/or deployment of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explo-
Sive dev1ces. See, e.g., Agamst Sov1et Plan to Explode 50 Megaton Bomb, G.A. Res. 1632 (XVI), 
16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961); On an Undertakmg by Coun-
tnes Possessmg No Nuclear Weapons Not to Have Such Weapons zn their Temtory, G.A. Res. 1664 
(XVI), 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 5, U.N. Doc. N5100 (1961); On Preventwn of the 
Wider Dissemznatwn of Nuclear Weapons, G.A. Res. 1665 (XVI), 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) 
at 5, U.N. Doc. N5100 (1961); On the Urgent Need for Suspenswn of Nuclear Tests, G.A. Res. 
1762 A & B (XVIII), 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 3, U.N. Doc. N5127 (1962); Regard-
tng Weapons of Mass Destruction m Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1884 (XVIU). 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 15) at 13, U.N. Doc. N5515 (1964); On the Urgent Need for Suspension of Nuclear and 
Thermo-Nuclear, G.A. Res. 1910 (XVIII), 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 14, U.N. Doc. 
N5515 (1963); see also Falk, The Sh1moda Case: A Legal Apprmsal of the Atom1c Attacks Upon 
Hirosh1ma and Nagasaki, 59 AM.J. INT'L L. 759 (1965); U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4), 11(1) and 
26(1). However, It may be argued with equal force that the treaties have not been w1dely 
enough accepted to become customary mtematwnallaw and that U.N. resolutions by their 
very nature are not bmding m any legal sense. On the legal effect of General Assembly 
resolutions, seeR. FALK, THE STATUS OF THE LAw IN INT'L SociETY 176 (l970);Johnson, The 
Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the Umted Natwns, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 97 
( 1956); and Sloan, The Binding Force of Recommendatwn of the General Assembly of the Umted 
Natwns, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1-33 (1948). 
115. Treaty Banmng Nuclear Weapons Tests m the Atmosphere, m Outer Space and 
Under Water, supra note 96. 
ll6. It has even been argued by one commentator that location of nuclear power 
plant near national boundanes vwlates mtematwnallaw. The author comes to the conclu-
Sion that: 
Assummg that no speCial authonzmg Circumstances prevail, conduct of an activity m 
frontier areas IS mcompatible With mtematlonal law if: (a) the activity concerned m-
volves maJor nsk of transnational harm; (b) this nsk 1s function, at least to Signifi-
cant degree, of the location m wh1ch the activity takes place; and (c) the activity m that 
frontier location amounts to an meffiCient use between the nsk creatmg and nsk ex-
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IV juDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF CusTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAw 
AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAw GovERNING 
TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 
As Is so often the case, JUdicial enforceability IS an obstacle to 
enforcement of mternatiOnal responsibility for extraterntonal 
pollution. The mdiv1dual pnvate plamtiff will be essentially re-
stncted to recovery m the domestic courts of state, wherem the 
environmental InJUry occurred or the mJunes took place. 117 
Whether mternat10nal rules of liability can be utilized will depend 
pnmarily upon whether and the extent to whtch mternatwnallaw 
IS mcorporated mto the states domestic law 118 For example, m 
the Umted States courts non-resident aliens may sue under 28 
U.S.C. § 1350 m the federal courts for extraterntonally effective 
torts committed wtthm the Umted States.11 9 Foretgn natiOnals 
may bnng smt m federal court based on state tort law under di-
versity JUnsdictton. 12o In the Paquette Habana case, the Umted 
States Supreme Court has stated that " where there Is no 
treaty and no controlling executive or legtslative act or JUdioal 
decision, resort must be had to customs and usages of ctvilized 
natiOns. " 121 Thus, to a limited extent, mternat10nallaw may 
be utilized by the Umted States courts. 122 Other procedural hur 
dles, such as soveretgn tmmumty and standing, must, however be 
overcome. Under the Umted States Foretgn Sovereign Immum-
ttes Act of 1976, for example, there IS JUnsdictton m the Umted 
States federal courts over a foretgn state for among other thmgs, 
direct InJury m the Umted States by a sovereign as a result of 
posed states of the mtemauonally shared natural resources concerned, provided the 
nsk Js not already of such an obvious nature or magmtude as to render the activity 
mcompatible per se w1th fundamental pnnc1ples of the sovereign equality and mde-
pendence of states. 
Hand!, An Intematwnal Legal PerspectiVe on the Conduct of Abnormally Dangerous Act1v1t1es m Fron-
tii!T Areas: The Case of Nuclear Power Plant Sitmg, 7 EcoLOGY L.Q I, 47 (1978). 
117 Comment, Compensatmg Pnvate Parties for Transnatwnal Pollut1o11 Injury, 58 ST. JoHN's 
L. REV. 528, 531 (1984). 
118. For companson of domestic polluuon laws, see P DowNING AND K. HUNF, INT'L 
COMPARISONS IN IMPLEMENTING POLLUTION LAws (1983). 
119. Compensatmg Pnvate Parties for Transnatwnal Pollut1on, supra note 117 at 533. 
120. !d. 
121. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); see alm Lillich, Domestic lnstllutwns m 4 
THE FUTURE OF THE INT'L LEGAL ORDER 384, 387-392 (1972). 
122. See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Filaruga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 
876 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Fischer, Aod Ram: Deploymg Pnvate Damage Actwns Agarnst Trans-
boundary Polluters, 19 TRIAL 57 (1983). 
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commercial activities. 123 Under the Umted States Supreme Court 
deciSion m Sierra Club v. Morton, 124 the plamtiff will have to 
demonstrate that the plamtiff uses the InJUred environment and 
has suffered tnjury m that use.l 25 A promiSing approach toward 
overcommg standing obstacles relevant to transboundary pollu-
tion IS reflected m the Nordic Convention on the ProtectiOn of 
the Environment, grantmg citizens of the member countnes re-
Ciprocal access to each other s courts and admmistrative agenCies 
for "any person affected by a nmsance caused by environmen-
tally harmful activities." 126 Even if the plamtiff succeeds m a do-
mestic court, enforcement extranat10nally IS largely dependent 
upon the cooperation of the defendant state, and InJUnctive relief 
Is highly unlikely 121 
For state agamst state claims, the obvious forum for enforce 
ment IS the Intenat10nal Court of JustiCe, yet the hurdles to en-
forcement are at least as 1mposmg as those whiCh may be 
encountered m domestic courts.I 28 The Court's JUnsdictiOn ex 
tends to "all cases which the parties refer to It and all matters 
specially provided for m the Charter of the Umted Nations or m 
treaties and conventions m force." 129 A smt, however may only 
be brought by a state agamst a state.I30 No state IS subJeCt to the 
Court's JUnsdiction unless It has consented to be}31 Any state 
whiCh has been sued may not only assert Its own reservatiOns to 
consent to be sued (asummg It has consented m the first place), 
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982); see generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391, 1441, 1602-
1611 ( 1982). Sectwn 1605 qualifies the doctnne of absolute sovereign Immumty by al-
lowmg federal courts to have JUnsdiction over claims agamst sovereign based on waiver 
ofimmumty, commercial activity camed on Withm the Umted States, or outside the Umted 
States if the activity causes direct effect withm the Umted States, expropnation, nghts m 
gifts or bequests of immovable property, non-commercial torts, and certam mantime liens. 
Id. § 1605. 
124. 405 u.s. 727 (1972). 
125. Weiss, supra note 87 at 567 
126. Convention on the ProtectiOn of the Environment, Feb. 19, 1971, reprtnted m, 13 
I.L.M. 591 (1974). 
127 Compensatmg Pnvate Part1es for Transnational Pollut1on, supra note 117 at 531-32; 
Fischer, supra note 122, at 58. 
128. Of course, the state may pursue diplomatic and International channels to obtam 
compensatory damages, or attempt arbitration or negotiation. Compensatmg Pnvate Parttes 
for Transnational In;ury, supra note ll 7 at 531. 
129. Statute of the International Court of justice, supra note 52, art. 36(1); see also Weiss, 
supra note 87 at 570. 
130. Statute of the International Court of justice, supra note 70, art. 34; see also Compen-
sating Pnvate Part1es for TransnatiOnal Pollution, supra note 117 at 538. 
131. Statute of International Court of Justice, supra note 70, art. 36(2). 
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but also those of the plamtiff state. 132 Such reservations fre 
quently exempt from the JUrisdictiOn of the Court Issues of "do-
mestic" JUrisdiction of "national security " 133 Even 1f these 
hurdles are surmountable, there must be complete exhaust1on of 
any domestic remedies. 134 Even assummg that all these obstacles 
may be overcome and the plamtiff state wms, opmwns of the 
Court may only be enforced by the Umted Nations Security 
Council, m wh1ch the maJOr nuclear powers have the veto 
power 135 
V LIABILITY FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION PURSUANT 
TO TREATY LAW 
Enforcement of mternatwnal law by treaty 1s more effective 
than enforcement of custom and general prmCiples of law 136 Yet 
on the whole, enforcement provisions m extant treaties are too 
vague to provide for meanmgful enforcement, or not enough nu-
clear powers are parties to the treaties to provide any meanmgful 
protect1on. 137 Although a full survey of all such treaty provisions 
governmg trans boundary pollution 1s beyond the scope of this ar 
ticle, 138 there are only a few relevant to transboundary pollution 
from nuclear acodents. 
132. "The states parties to the present Statute may at any ume declare that they recog-
mze as compulsory 1pso facto and Without special agreement m relat1on to any other state ac-
ceptmg the same obligation, the JUrtsdictton of the Court. ld. 
133. See generally WESTON, fALK & D'AMATO, INT'L LAw AND WORLD ORDER 415-426 
(1980). 
134. Compensatmg Pnvate Part1es for Transnational Pollution, supra note 117 at 557 
135. U.N. CHARTER art. 94. 
136. See, e.g., Compensatmg Pnvate Plamtiffs for Transnational Pollut1on, supra note 117 at 
557 
137 !d. at 540-41. 
138. The 1972 Stockholm Conference led to the creation of an msUtuuon, the Umted 
Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) as catalyst and coordinator of international en-
VIronmental efforts, mcluding mternauonal efforts to protect the manne environment. 
Belsky, supra note 103, at 741 n.33. Also followmg the conference, several national gov-
ernments and mternauonal orgamzauons responded to the dictate of Pnnctple 22 of the 
Stockholm Declaration calling for states to cooperate to develop utternauonal law for 
transboundary environmental damage. One such response was from the Envin>nment 
Committee of the Orgamzauon for Economtc Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
The OECD ts regiOnal economic orgamzauon established m Europe m 1961. For v1ew 
of few regiOnal environmental programs, see generally Comment, Equal Rights of Access m 
Matters ofTransboundary Pollution: Its Prospects m lndustnal and Develapmg Countnes, 14 CAL. W 
INT'L LJ. 192 (1984); see also Bentil,lmplementatlon of Common Market Envzronment Protectzon 
Laws, 128 Souc. J. 393 (1984); Dickstem, Nat1onal Envzronmental Hazards and lnternatzonal 
Law, 23 INT'L & CoMP L.Q 426, 443-444 (1974) (describmg Euratom control over radia-
1987] Chemobyl 227 
The Vienna ConventiOn on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
grants JUrisdictiOn over cases for nuclear damage to the courts of 
the state m whose terntory the damage occurred.I39 Article II of 
the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage I40 
makes the "operator" (the person so designated or recogmzed by 
the Installation State) of a nuclear mstallation liable for any "nu-
clear damge" "Nuclear damage" IS defined m Article I(l)(k) to 
mclude: 
(i) loss oflife, any personal InJUry or any loss of, or damage to, 
property which anses out of or results from the radioactive 
properties or a combmatwns of radioactive properties With 
toxic, explosive or other hazardous properties of nuclear fuel 
or radioactive products or wastes m, or of nuclear matenal 
commg from, ongmatmg m, or sent to, a nuclear mstallauon; 
(ii) any other loss or damage so ansmg or resultmg if and to 
the extent that the law of the competent court so provides; and 
(iii) if the law of the InstallatiOn State so provides, loss of life, 
any personal InJUry or any loss of, or damage to, property 
which anses out of or results from other Iomzmg radiation 
emitted by any other source of radiation mside a nuclear 
mstallatiOn." I 4 I 
A responsible operator may be an mdividual, a partnership, any 
pnvate or public body any mternat10nal orgamzation havmg a 
legal personality under the law of the InstallatiOn State.I42 Liabil-
Ity for nuclear damage IS absolute except that: the operator may 
be exempt from liability for damage directly due to an act of 
tlon hazards); and the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary A1r Pollution, Nov. 13, 
1979, E/ECE/1010, T.I.A.S. No. 10541. For further elaboration on Umted Nauons efforts 
to protect the environment and those of other mtematlonal orgamzatlons, see Sm1th, The 
Umted Nat1ons and the Environment: Somet1111es Great Not1on~, 19 TEXAS INT'L LJ. 335 (1984); 
DeveWpments, The Umted Nat1ons EnVIronment Programme After Decade: The Nazrob1 Sess1on of 
Spmal Character May 1981, 12 DENVERJ. INT'L L. & PoLICY 269 (1982-83); OFfiCE OF RE-
SEARCH & DEVELOPMENT, EPA, A SURVEY OF INT'L INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: 
THE STRATEGIES THEY USE TO ABATE POLLUTION, (1978); STANLEY, ENVIRONMENTAL MAN-
AGEMENT BY THE UNITED NATIONS 1972). 
139. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, repnnted 
m, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage (1974) (Legal Senes No.4). See also Te1wul, supra note 84, at 61, n.57 
The Vienna Conventton was unammously adopted by the IAEA m 1963. The Sovtet 
Umon Js member of the IAEA but JS not party to the Convention. The analysis of 
Soviet responsibility herem, therefore, IS apart from whatever responsibility It may be held 
to pursuant to this treaty obligation. Despite Tiewul' assertion, art. XI (I) giVes JUnsdic 
tiOn only to where the "incident" occurred. 
140. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, supra note 139, art. II. 
141. /d. art. 1(1)(K). 
142. ld. art. l(l)(a), (c). 
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armed conflict, hostiliues, civil war or msurrectiOn; 143 that the 
damage resulted wholly or partially from the gross negligence or 
mtent10nal wrong of the victim himself, or that, unless the state 
otherwise provides, the damage resulted from grave natural disas-
ter of an exceptiOnal character 144 Where the nuclear accident oc 
curred outside the terntory of any state, or where Its location 
cannot accurately be determmed, the courts of the mstallat10n 
state have JUnsdictiOn. 145 The Vienna ConventiOn excludes any 
JUrisdictional Immumties ansmg under national or mternat10nal 
law once a court has obtamed JUnsdictiOn under the Conven-
tion.146 The extent of recoverable damage may not be limited to 
less than five million Umted States dollars. 147 
Under Article VI(l) of the Vienna Convention, claims for com-
pensation With respect to nuclear damage are barred, unless 
presented w1thm ten years from the date of the nuclear aco-
dent.148 This limitation does not apply If under the law of the 
InstallatiOn State, the liability of the operator IS covered by msur 
ance or other financial secunty or by state funds, for a penod 
longer than ten years. 149 Notwithstanding these provisions, the 
forum state may erect a limitation penod of between three and 
ten years from the date on which the InJured party had or should 
have had knowledge both of the damage, and of the Identity of 
the operator liable therefor 150 Unless the law of the competent 
state otherwise provides, a person who has brought a timely ac 
t10n for compensation may at any time before final Judgment 
amend h1s claim to take mto account any aggravatiOn of the InJU-
nes.151 The InstallatiOn State shall msure the payment of claims 
agamst the operator providing the necessary funds to the extent 
that the y1eld of msurance or other financial secunty IS madequate 
to satisfy such cla1ms. 152 An optiOnal protocol to the Convention 
143. /d. art. IV(3)(a). 
144. /d. art. IV 
145. !d. art. XI(2). 
146. /d. art. XIV 
147 !d. art. V 
148. ld. art. VI(l). 
149. !d. 
150. /d. art. VI{3). 
151. /d. art. VI(4). In addiuon to the Vienna convention, there are also several bilateral 
and reg10nal arrangements for the payment of compensation to vrctuns of nuclear actrvrty 
or polluuon resultmg therefrom on the hrgh seas, the scope of liability rangmg from par-
tial to absolute. See Tiewul, supra note 84, at 61 n. 59. 
152. Vienna Convention, supra note 139, art. VII(l). 
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provides that disputes concermng the mterpretation or applica-
tion of the Convention are to be decided by the InternatiOnal 
Court of Justice.I 53 Similar provlSlons for civil damages are con-
tamed m the Pans Convention ofThird Party Liability m the Field 
of Nuclear Energy 154 and the Brussels Convention Supplemen-
tary to the Pans ConventiOn, 155 which were sponsored by the Or 
gamzatwn for Economic CooperatiOn and Development and on 
which the Vienna Convention was modeled. 
The Vienna Convention entered mto force m 1977 but there 
are only approx1mately ten states that are parties to the Conven-
tion, and none of these states IS a maJor nuclear power 156 The 
Pans ConventiOn entered mto force m 1968 and the Brussels 
Supplementary ConventiOn went mto force m 1974.157 The par 
ties to these treaties do mclude most of Europe, but neither the 
Soviet Umon nor the Umted States 1s a party 158 
Pursuant to the Statute of the InternatiOnal AtomiC Energy 
Agency "[a]ny question or dispute concernmg the mterpretation 
or application [of the Statute] which IS not settled by negotiation 
shall be referred to the InternatiOnal Court ofjustiCe m conform-
Ity with the Statute of the Court, unless the parties concerned 
agree on another mode of settlement." 159 The General Confer 
ence and the Board of Governors of IAEA, with authonzation 
from the General Assembly of the Umted Nations, may request an 
advisory opmwn on any legal questiOn ansmg withm the scope of 
the IAEA s actiVIties. 160 However the Agency has no authonty to 
Issue mandatory safety standards and, therefore, this provision 
153. Vienna ConventiOn, supra note 139, art. I. 
154. Pans Convention on Third Party Liability m the Field of Nuclear Energy, july 29, 
1960, repnnted m, 55 AM.]. INT'L L. 1082 (1961). 
155. Convention Supplementary to the Pans Convention of July 29, 1960 on Th1rd 
Party Liability m the Field of Nuclear Energy, supra note 154. See also The Convention on 
the Liability of Operations of Nuclear Sh•ps,Jan. 31, 1963, repnnted m, 2 I.L.M. 685 (1963); 
see also Convention on Civil Liability m the Field of Mantime Camage of Nuclear Matenal, 
Dec. 17 1971, repnnted m, ll I.L.M. 277 (1972) (adds to the Pans and Vienna 
Conventions). 
156. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT NUCLEAR ENERGY 
AGENCY & INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, NUCLEAR THIRD PARTY LIABILITY AND 
INSURANCE STATUS AND PROSPECTS 47 (1985). 
157 !d. 
158. /d. 
159. Statute of International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note ll4, art. XVIIA. 
160. !d. art. XVIIB. Although the IAEA IS authonzed to adopt safety standards, the 
standards are techmcally without bmding effect. See generally, Dickstem, supra note 138, at 
426, 436-38. 
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would do little or nothmg to Impose state liability for trans-
boundary damage from unsafe operatiOn of a nuclear reactor 
IAEA s safety standards are meant to apply only to the agency s 
own operatiOns and operatiOns earned out at Its request or under 
Its control or superv1Slon. 161 Safety standards are merely recom-
mended by the IAEA and are not, therefore, bmding on nuclear 
activities not provided through the NRC. The IAEA, however 
has negotiated bilateral agreements for safety standards with 
twenty-one countnes. 162 
For pollutiOn of the sea, the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention 
Imposes on the mdividual state the responsibility to enforce their 
own laws and to adopt the necessary legislative, admmistrative, 
and other measures to Implement mternatwnal rules and stan-
dards established through competent mternat10nal orgamzat10ns 
or diplomatlC conferences.l6~ The prov1Slons of the 1982 Con-
ventiOn, unlike the provlSlons of the four 1958 ConventiOns dis-
cussed above, m all likelihood establish new pnnCiples of 
mternat10nallaw not codification of pre-existmg custom. There 
fore, they would be bmding only on the parties to the Conven-
tiOn. Perhaps the most forceful enforcement provlSlon m the 
1982 ConventiOn IS the remedy drawn from customary mterna-
twnal law of mtervent10n for mantime casualties to avmd pollu-
tiOn under Article 221 That Article preserves " the nght of 
States, pursuant to mternatwnallaw both customary and conven-
tiOnal, to take and enforce measures beyond the terntonal sea 
proportiOnate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their 
coastline or related mterests, mcluding fishmg, from pollution or 
threat of pollutiOn followmg upon a man time casualty or acts re-
latmg to such a casualty which may reasonably be expected to 
result m maJOr harmful consequences." 164 
161. Statute oflnternauona1 Atom1c Energy Agency, supra note 114, art. IIA.6. Compare 
Treaty Establishmg the European Atom1c Energy Commumty (Euratom) art. 30-39, 77-85, 
Mar. 25, 1957 298 U.N.T.S. 167 (mandatory safety standards for all members). 
162. International Nuclear Safety Concerns: Heanngs Before the Subcomm. on Energy, Nuclear 
Proliferatwn, and Governmental Processes of the Senate Comm. on Governmental AffairS, 99th Cong., 
2d. Sess., 5 (1986) (statement of Allan I. Mende1owltz, Assoc. Dir., National Secunty and 
lnt'l AffairS Div., GAO) 
163. See generally Umted Natwns Conventwn on the Law of the Sea, supra note 86, art. 213-
222. 
164. /d., art. 221(1). 
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VI. NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AND PREVENTION OF DAMAGE UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 
It would be remiss to evaluate the Chernobyl acctdent Without 
recogmtion of the human anxiety suffenng, and loss of life m the 
Soviet Umon, and what may be the loss to the Soviet people of an 
area of nch, much needed agncultural land. RIChard Falk has 
suggested that human nghts must mclude "the nghts of mdividu-
als and groups (including those of unborn generations) to be rea-
sonably secure about their prospects of mimmal physical well-
bemg and survival (and) the duty of governments and peoples to 
uphold this nght by workmg to achieve sustamable forms of na-
tiOnal and ecological secunty " 165 Many of the mternattonal dec 
laratwns that aspire to the most stnngent protection of the 
environment portray the nght to a safe and clean environment as 
a fundamental human nght. 166 In the context of the Chernobyl 
tragedy environmental destructiOn may be seen as a depnvation 
of nghts tantamount to a depnvatwn of Civil, economic and social 
human nghts. 
Though difficult to make an accurate assessment of the damage 
to Soviet agnculturalland around Chernobyl without accurate ra-
diatiOn measurements, some general conclusiOns can be made. 
SCientists have testified that radioactiVIty was likely to have dam-
aged soil, water livestock and crops withm a 2000-square-mile 
regwn of the Ukrame that surrounds the cnppled plant. 16' The 
Ukrame produces 20% of the Soviet gram crop, and IS the Soviet 
165. R. FALK, HuMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SovEREIGNTY 146-47 (1981); see also W GoR-
MLEY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FORINT' CoOPERATION (1976); Cas-
sm, Les Dr01ts de l'homme, 140 RECUEIL DES CouRS 321, 327 (1974 IV); Falk, Toward World 
Order Respectful of the Global Ecosystem, ENv AFFAIRS 251 (1971); Gofman, The EXIStence of 
Nuclear Weapons: Pnme Envzronmental Threat, l ENv. AFFAIRS 782 (1972); cJ. Stockholm Con-
ventwn supra note 66, PnnCiples l, 2, & 4. 
166. See The Pervers1on of SCience and Technology: An Indictment (Poona Indict-
ment), adopted by the partiCipants m the fourteenth meetmg of the World Order Models 
PrOJeCt held m Poona, India, july 2-10, 1978, repnnted m, 4 ALTERNATIVES- A jOURNAL OF 
WORLD PoLicY 413 (1978-1979); Independent Declaration on the Environment (Dai Dong 
Dedarauon}, adopted by the partiCipants m the Da1 Dong Independent Conference on the 
Environment, Gramage Stiftsgard, Sweden, June l-6, 1972, repnnted m, l ALTERNATIVES-
A jouRNAL OF WoRLD PoLICY 406 (1975); Declaration on the Th1rd World and the Human 
Env1ronment (01 Committee Declaration) adopted by the participants m the Conference 
on Problems of the Third World and the Human Environment, Stockholm, June, 1972, 
repnnted zn, B. WESTON, R. FALK & A. D'AMATO, BASIC DocUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 
AND WORLD ORDER 427 (1980). 
167 N.Y. Times, May 6, 1986, at A7 col. l. 
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Umon s second largest livestock production area. 168 The 
Chernobyl plant ts on the northern edge of the Ukrame farm belt, 
the location of the country s best soil, and a maJOr source for 
wheat, sugar beets and forage for livestock. 169 North of the 
Chernobyl plant ts another nch farm belt, and the Chernobyl area 
Itself Is an area of datry farms and cultivation of rye, potatoes, and 
fiber flax. 170 The acctdent occurred wtthm months of the harvest-
mg season. 171 Never before has a natiOn been faced wtth the pos-
sibility of extenstve radiatiOn damage to large tracts of 
farmland. 172 Some have suggested that wtthm stx miles of the re-
actor land must be extremely contammated and will probably be 
unmhabttable for generattons. 173 
The heavtest radioactive particles produced by the accident 
could be expected to fall wtthm a fifty mile radius of the plant. 174 
Opttons for detoxifymg any radioactive soil are limtted. 175 For 
relatively small areas, surface soil can be stnpped and buned else-
where.176 The Umted States has used thts techmque twice-once 
when a Umted States military plane carrymg nuclear weapons 
crashed m Spam m the 1950's, and once as a result of contamma-
tiOn of the Marshall Islands dunng nuclear weapons tests m the 
PaCific. 177 With extensive contammatwn, the only remedy may be 
to watt several hundred years. 1' 8 
On May 15th Mikhail Gorbachev m a natiOnally televtsed ad-
dress, clatmed "the worst has passed" and proposed a global 
warmng system to handle future acCldents."9 Ukratman Pnme 
Mimster Aleksandr Lyashko told reporters m Kiev that Moscow 
offiCials did not learn the full gravtty of the accident until April 28 
when It was reported by the Soviet government (although one 
can questiOn how long It takes to understand the gravtty of an 
explosiOn m a nuclear reactor that blows Its roof off) 180 On May 
168. !d. 
169. N.Y. Times, May 5, 1986, at AS, col. l. 
170. !d. 
171. /d. 
172. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1986, at 4, col. 2. 
173. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1986, at All, col. 4. 
174. N.Y Times, May 2, 1986, at AIO, col. 6. 




179. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1986, at I, col. 6. 
180. NEWSWEEK, May 19, 1986, at 37 
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1st the InternatiOnal Atomic Energy Agency sent a telex to the 
Soviet authonties, urgently requestmg further details of the acci-
dent.181 The twelve member countnes of the Common Market 
protested the lack of notice and mformat10n.182 The West Ger 
man Foreign Mimster Hans~Dietnch Genscher said the Soviet 
Umon should authonze experts from the IAEA to VISit the Site 
(they subsequently did so).I 83 Although agency mspectors had 
vtstted Soviet nuclear power states m the past, the agency did not 
have the authonty to order the Soviet government to supply m-
formatiOn.184 One newspaper reported that the Umted States 
Secretary of State George Schultz was attemptmg to persuade the 
Soviet Umon to agree to safety mspect10ns of Its plant by the 
IAEA. 185 
By May 4th, Secretary of State Schultz was argumg that there 
was "an mherent obligation that states have to provide mforma-
tiOn" about such events as nuclear acodents which have an effect 
on people beyond their borders. 186 Also m May m addition to 
denouncmg the Soviet Umon, the seven mdustnal nations at the 
Tokyo EconomiC Summit meetmg called for a new treaty to estab-
lish rules for mternat10nal behavior m case of nuclear aco-
dents.187 In 1981, the Umted States had floated a proposal 
similar to that of the Economic Summit at the Umted Nations but 
the proposal received little attention. On June 3rd, Gorbachev 
himself called on other nations to JOin the Soviet Umon m 
strengthemng safeguards agamst nuclear disaster such as 
Chernobyl m a message to Secretary General of the Umted Na-
tiOns calling for an mternatiOnal conventiOn on the subject. 188 
The Soviet leader also called for stronger measures to prevent 
acts of nuclear terronsm. 189 Most Important, he said, was "a sys-
tem of prompt notification m the event of accidents and malfunc 
tions at atomic power plants when such occurences are 
accompamed by the release ofradiatiOn."I90 Mr Gorbachev sug-
I8l. N.Y. Times, May I, I986 at AI, col. 3. 
I82. !d. at AI2, col. 6. 
183. ld. 
I84. /d. 
I85. N.Y. Times, May 5, I986, at A6, col. 6. 
I86. N.Y. Times, May 4, I986, at I2, col. 3-4. 
I87 N.Y. Times, May 22, I986, at A3I, col. 5. 
I88. N.Y. Times, June 4, I986, at I2, col. I. 
I89. /d. 
I90. !d. 
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gested that a nuclear safeguard system be codified m one or more 
mtemat10nal conventions and that existmg agenCies like the In-
ternatiOnal Atomic Energy Agency the World Health Orgamza-
tlon, the Umted NatiOns Envuonmental Program and the World 
Meteorolog~cal Orgamzation be used to strengthen safety meas-
ures for nuclear reactors. 191 On june 10, Gorbachev went even 
further In Budapest he said that the leading nuclear powers 
should work JOmtly to design a new generation of more reliable 
nuclear reactors and agree to provide free medical care, housmg, 
and other finanCial assistance to acetdent vicUms. 192 Soviet offi-
Cials, however reiterated Moscow s positiOn that It owed no com-
pensation to other European countnes because of damage to 
agnculture followmg the nuclear accident at Chernobyl. 193 So-
viet officials have argued that damage to agnculture m Europe 
had been caused by media, consumer and government reactiOn to 
the accident, not a threat of radiation, and turned aside questiOns 
about compensat10n. 194 Meanwhile, on june lOth m Vienna at a 
meetmg of the Governmg Board of the InternatiOnal AtomiC En-
ergy Agency countnes with nuclear weapons such as the Umted 
States and the Soviet Umon seemed undecided whether to allow 
military nuclear plants to be covered by a treaty requmng prompt 
notificatiOn of any nuclear acetdents. 195 Two treaties were under 
consideration by the IAEA. One would reqmre member coun-
tnes to mform others Immediately of any significant release of ra-
dioactive matenal. 196 The other provides for other countnes to 
give prompt assistance m the event of such an acCident. 197 The 
Govermng Board also came closer to agreement on a package of 
safety measures mspired by Chemobyl. 198 The agency planned 
to mcrease the number of mspect10ns It makes to check safety 
precautions at member countnes nuclear mstallat10ns. 199 
Many officials fear that any attempt to define preCisely what 
kmd of accident would have to be reported would be challenged 
by governments hostile to nuclear power and by any nuclear envi-
191. !d. at Al2, col. 2. 
192. Washmgton Post, June 10, 1986, at A21, col. 4. 
193. /d. 
194. /d. 
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ronmental orgamzations. Both the Umted States and Soviet 
Umon seemed unwilling to report accidents at military nuclear 
plants if disclosure would oblige them to reveal military 
secrets.200 As a result, many offiCials suspect that the new treaty 
will be drafted m vague terms, With the burden of deciding 
whether a nuclear accident could affect other countnes restmg on 
the government concerned. 
On July 24th, a foreign mimstry spokesman for the Soviet 
Umon said that the expenments that caused the Chernobyl nu-
clear accident were mtended to determme how long the plant 
would contmue to produce electnCity m an unexpected reactor 
shutdown. "The Important thmg IS not that the expenment was 
conducted," the spokesman said, "the Important thmg IS that It 
was conducted Without the necessary precautions."201 He said 
the techmcal details would be available when a report of the So-
viet Umon Government Inqmry Commission was delivered to the 
IAEA m Vienna m August. He also demed that eng.neers of the 
Chernobyl statiOn were trymg to simulate an accident when the 
real accident occurred.202 SpeculatiOn contmued, however that 
the accident may have been the result of expenments relatmg to 
nuclear weapons. Among the officials dismissed after the 
Chernobyl acodent was Aleksmdr G. Neshkov First Deputy Min-
Ister of Medium Machme-Building, for the production of fission-
able matenal and nuclear arms.203 The connection between this 
agency and the generatiOn of commercial nuclear power has not 
been offioally explamed. As a result of the Chernobyl accident, 
the nuclear electnoty mdustry has now been placed under a 
newly formed separate Mimstry of Nuclear Power m the Soviet 
Umon.204 
Everywhere, there was much talk about the Soviet Umon s In-
ternatiOnal obligatiOn "to provide mformation."205 Although the 
mternat10nal obligatiOn of the Soviet Umon to warn other states 
of the approachmg radioactivity and to exchange mformatton was 
pnmarily a moral one, some mternatiOnallaw scholars argue that 
200. N.Y. Times, June II, 1986, at A4, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1986, at Al5, col. 1; 
Reuters, Sept. 24, 1986, AM cycle. 




205. N.Y Times, May 1, 1986, at AI, col. 3; /d. at AI, col. 5. 
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there exists a present or emergmg rule of mternat10nllaw reqmr 
mg states to g.ve notice of mformat10n concernmg possible envi-
ronmental harm to potentially affected states.206 Although full 
analys1s of whether such a duty ex1sts 1s beyond the scope of th1s 
article, an agreement mcorporatmg such an obligation and others 
appears 1mmment. In fact, when a Soviet submanne carrymg nu-
clear weapons sank off the coast of Bermuda, the Soviet Umon 
Immediately notified the Umted States, on October 4th, m ac 
cordance w1th a draft accord requmng prompt notice of nuclear 
accidents. 207 
VII. THE NEED FOR REFORM 
If any State seeks relief under mtemat10nallaw agamst the So-
viet Umon, the smt will probably not focus on the lack of notice, 
but rather on the damage to health and agnculture m neighbor 
mg states. For example, on May 5th, the Federal Republic of 
Germany sa1d that It was settmg up a group to determme whether 
It could claim compensatiOn from the Soviet Umon for eventual 
damage to crops from fallout from the Chernobyl disaster 208 On 
May 3, German authonties m Bonn had ordered the Impounding 
of supplies of fresh milk from several da1ry regions contammated 
by the fallout. 209 Although Germany never brought smt, It and 
many other countnes and pnvate groups gave senous considera-
tiOn to the mtemat10nallaw that would govern such a smt. While 
under the famous Trail Smelter case, one can conclude that a state 
IS responsible for any matenal damage that occurs to another 
state, even for conduct wh1ch emanates from pnvate parties 
withm the offending state, if both matenal damage and causatiOn 
206. For further discussiOn concemmg whether mtemauonal law reqmres notice and 
exchange of mformatlon regarding state' lawful activities wh~eh may cause trans-
boundary environmental damage, see Carvell, The North Dakota Garnson DiversiOn Pro;ect and 
International Environmental Law, 60 N.D.L. REv. 603, 637-646 (1984); Schneider, State Re-
sponsibility for Environmental Protect1on and PreservatiOn, 2 YALE STUDIES IN WoRLD PuBLIC OR-
DER 32, 60-65 (1975); see also Handl, supra note 116, on the legality of nuclear plant s1tmg 
m border areas. Arucle 28(2) of the Atomic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany 
reqmred the state to compensate VICtims of the acc1dent for property damage and agncul-
tural damage. See also RESTATEMENT OF FoREIGN RELATIONS LAw§ 601 comment (1983). 
207 N.Y. Times, Oct. 7 1986, at A30, col. I. 
208. N.Y Times, May 5, 1986, at A6, col. 6. Article 38(2) of the Atomic Law of the 
Federal Republic of Germany reqmred the state to compensate VICtims of the acCident for 
certam property damage and agncultural losses. 
209. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1986, at A4 (picture caption). 
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can be demonstrated, mternational law has several roadblocks to 
recovery 
First, what IS not clear under mternationallaw IS the applicable 
standard for determmmg liability As discussed above, there are 
three possible standards: (1) liability which must be predicated on 
negligence, recklessness, or mtent10nal harm; (2) liability for an 
unreasonable mterference With the natural resources of another 
state; or (3) liability predicated on absolute liability or stnct liabil-
Ity for ultrahazardous activities. Under the second and third stan-
dards, the state would be liable even if It was not the operator of 
the reactor at which the acCident occurred. Second, the damages 
that would be recoverable are even more uncertam. Under mter 
national law damages are obtamable for loss of property and per 
sonal InJUry Recovery for economic loss, however seems 
somewhat less sure, as do damages for emotiOnal distress and 
psychologiCal Impairment. 
Third, the maJOr failing of mternatiOnal law m this area IS the 
lack of means for actual enforcement. The pnmary means of en-
forcement would be m the domestic courts of the transgressor 
state, but the availability of mternat10nal law m such forums 
would depend on the extent to which the state mcorporates mter 
national law mto Its own domestiC law and holds It to be enforcea-
ble. Enforcement would be hampered by many common 
domestic bamers to JUnsdictiOn and enforcement, e.g. sovereign 
1mmumty extra-terntonal enforcement, and standing. Though 
the obvious forum, the InternatiOnal Court of Justice can only be 
utilized by a state agamst a state and only If the defendant state 
consents to JUnsdictiOn. The Soviet Umon has not consented to 
JUrtsdictiOn m the InternatiOnal Court ofJusttce. In additiOn, de-
Cistons of the InternatiOnal Court of Justice are only enforceable 
by the Secunty Council of the Umted NatiOns, m which the Soviet 
Umon has a veto. Other problems with current mternat10nallaw 
exist. For example, there IS, at best, only an emergmg rule of 
mternatiOnallaw that notificatiOn and exchange of mformat10n IS 
reqmred m the event of an acCident that Imposes matenal damage 
upon another state. Also, the pnmary treaty specifically gov-
ernmg compensation for victims of a nuclear acCident Is the Vi-
enna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. Yet Its 
usefulness IS hampered by limited partiCipation m the treaty 
which does not mclude either the Umted States or the Soviet 
Umon. As for mternatiOnal standards of safety for nuclear reac 
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tors to prevent nuclear accidents, the IAEA only has the authonty 
under Its statute to mspect nuclear reactors to msure that the In-
formatiOn and assistance provided by the agency are not bemg 
1mproperly used for military purposes. Thus, the IAEA has no 
present authonty to Impose any bmding safety standards. 
What then would be the result if a European state attempted to 
seek compensatiOn from the Soviet Umon for the agnculture 
damage whiCh occurred from the Chernobyl accident? Under the 
prmoples of mternat10nal law analyzed above what would be the 
likely outcome of such a smt? Assummg that the Soviet Umon 
would not voluntarily provide compensatiOn, successful recovery 
IS very unlikely There Is no Issue of v1canous liability for the fall-
out damage because the Soviet Umon Is responsible directly as 
the operator of the Chernobyl plant. The next, more trouble 
some Issue would be the standards for liability As noted above, 
state responsibility IS generally predicated on fault, I.e., mten-
tional wrongs, recklessness, or negligence. However It has been 
argued that mternat10nal law recogmzes stnct liability for envi-
ronmental harm based on ultrahazardous actiVIty The operatiOn 
of a nuclear power plant should constitute an ultrahazardous ac 
tivity m which the harm cannot be removed through reasonable 
care. Fault standards are madequate to deal With the potential 
hazards from complex technology The standards of care and 
tests of forseeability become obscure and madequate when ap-
plied to the possible scope of a nuclear disaster Eqmty and eco-
nomic analysis both pomt toward 1mposmg the burden of 
compensatiOn on the nuclear mdustry and, ulumately on the 
state as the parties best able to reduce nsk and absorb damages. 
In attributmg to the state direct responsibility and stnct liability 
the state has a direct mcentiVe to legislate and regulate to mmi-
mize the nsk of the activity Limitations of causatiOn, force 
maJeure, and dollar limitatiOns on recovery210 are sufficient to as-
sure that states will not be unduly burdened m such a way as to 
hamper their discretiOn m developmg natiOnal energy resources. 
It IS partiCularly appropnate m the mternat10nal context that 
stnct liability should be recogmzed as the legal standard when 
matenal and environmental harm results from ultrahazardous ac 
tivities. Stnct liability for such harm avmds many of the problems 
210. Most states have domesuc statutes lim1Ung the amount of recovery for nuclear 
acCident. Congress 1s now recons1dermg the Pnce Anderson Act wh1ch sets lim1l of$665 
million for smgle acCident. N.Y. Times, june 15, 1986, § 3 (Busmess) at 3, col. 3. 
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assooated w1th fault standards m an mternat10nal settmg, such as 
discernmg norms of conduct that are suffioently pervas1ve 
around the globe to make 1t clear that dev1at10n below those 
norms would constttute negligence. Havmg noted the difficulity 
of developmg mternat10nally recogmzed defimt10ns of reasonable 
care, however a relatively strong argument can be made that the 
lack of a contamment structure and adequate backup system at 
Chernobyl was negligent and would be so recogmzed almost um-
versally Some Western experts on nuclear technology have as-
serted that the Sov1et Umon has the worst nuclear safety plannmg 
of any nation, even worse than that m developmg countnes and 
the rest of the Sov1et block.2' 1 
However even if we assume that It can be demonstrated m m-
tematiOnal law that the Sov1et Umon 1s liable for damages to 
those countnes whtch suffered from radioactive fall-out, that lia-
bility may not bejudioally enforceable. The Sov1et Umon has not 
consented to the JUnsdictlon of the InternatiOnal Court ofjust1ce. 
Therefore a state s only opt10n for JUdioal enforcement would be 
m 1ts own domestic courts or those of the Sov1et Umon where 
procedural and JUrisdictiOnal obstacles, such as sovere1gn lmmu-
mty standing and other obstacles previOusly discussed, would m 
all likelihood prevail. In additiOn, linkmg death and disease m the 
general population to the radioactive fall-out would present a dif-
ficult causatiOn 1ssue m any forum. Estimates of the number of 
cancer deaths from the acc1dent, for example, vaned from 5,100 
to 24,000.212 And finally even if a state 1s successful on the mer 
1ts m demonstratmg the damages, 1t 1s not at all clear what types 
of damages would be recoverable. Damages to person and prop-
erty would m all probability be recoverable. It 1s much less clear 
whether damages for economiC loss and damages for pam and 
suffenng could be recovered. To illustrate, Welsh farmers as late 
as August were unable to take the1r lambs to slaughter because of 
a government ban on sale of the lambs exposed to Chemobyl's 
radiat10n.213 Was the damage sustamed property damage, wh1ch 
would be recoverable, or economic loss, wh1ch would not be re 
coverable? Arguably if the lambs were actually contammated 
there would be property damage, but if the ban was purely pre-
cautionary there would only be econom1c loss. Viewed as an 1ssue 
211. N.Y. Times, May I, 1986, at Al2, col. l. 
212. N.Y. Times, Aug. 7 1986, at AI, col. 6. 
213. N.Y. Times, july 3, 1986, at AI, col. 2. 
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of causation, alternatively It would be the state government, not 
the radiatiOn from the accident, that caused the loss. Certamly 
that IS why the Soviet Umon stated that the damage to agnculture 
was the result of government and media overreactiOn and not the 
accident Itself. However if viewed as a rule of causatiOn rather 
than an arbitrary distmction m damages recoverable, It could be 
argued that such government quarantmes are reasonably forsee 
able as a result of an acodent such as Chernobyl. 
The difficulty under mternatwnal law m obtammg compensa-
tion from the Soviet Umon m what IS a relatively straightforward 
SituatiOn of state responsibility for radioactive contammatwn 
highlights the madequaoes of customary mternatwnallaw m ad-
dressmg state responsibility for transboundary pollution. To pro-
VIde more adequate protectiOn from future "Chernobyls" than 
that which presently exists, several relatively straightforward re 
forms should be made Immediately m the aftermath of accident's 
condemnatiOn. To avmd another accident like that at Chernobyl, 
efforts should be made by bilateral agreements between the IAEA 
and states to expand mspections by the IAEA to mclude safety 
mspections. Twenty-one countnes now have such agreements, 
and there are some mdicatwns of willingness on the part of the 
Soviet Umon to enter mto such an agreement. Extensive efforts 
should be made to mcrease adherence to the Vienna Convention 
on Compensation for Nuclear Damage. Because the most likely 
and most senous forms of damage from an acctdent ts agncultural 
damage, consideratiOn should be given to exemptmg such losses 
from the general prohibitiOn agamst recovery of economiC loss. 
Hopefully under the auspiCes of the IAEA, a treaty will be 
promulgated providing for notification and exchange of mforma-
hon m the event of nuclear accidents threatemng mternatwnal 
environmental harm. Such a treaty should mclude military reac 
tors as well as ovilian reactors, as there IS no difference m the 
environmental harm and It 1s unlikely that any such reqmrement 
wouldjeopardize any states natwnal secunty There should be a 
specific defimuon of what types of accidents would qualify for re-
portmg restnctions m order to avmd the very likely possibility of 
states makmg their own unilateral and self-servmg determmauon 
of what accidents should be reported. 
There IS presently no treaty whtch generally governs environ-
mental protection of global resources. Such a treaty could mcor 
porate current standards of protectwn m custom and general 
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pnnCiples of mtemat10nallaw while strengthemng their enforce-
ability by providing for mcorporat10n of those standards mto the 
domestic law of the treaty s signatones, and by providing for In-
ternational arbitration m adjudication of trans boundary pollution 
claims. Such a treaty might also reqmre notification and mterna-
tiOnal consultation before development of any proJect posmg an 
Immment, transboundary threat of environmental damage. 
The present time presents a umque opportumty to actually Im-
plement many of these suggestions, if for no other reason than 
that the Soviet Umon and the Umted States are trymg to outdo 
each other m argumg that somethmg must be done. In Septem-
ber Soviet offiCials announced that entombment of the fourth re 
actor at Chemobyl was on schedule, and that the first and second 
reactors would resume operation m November 214 In August, nu-
clear experts had already expressed concern w1th the Sov1et 
Umon s new safety plans for Chemobyl-type reactors.215 The 
IAEA proJects that by the year 2000, slightly more than half of the 
countnes With nuclear power plants will be the less technologi-
cally advanced, developmg countnes.216 The toxic destructiOn of 
Bhopal, the tragedy of the Challenger shuttle, and the accident at 
Chemobyl should serve as strikmg remmders that technology 
cannot regulate Itself. We are m the technologtcal space age, yet 
mtemat10nal environmental regulation IS still pnmitive. We can 
and do make mistakes, and we must be prepared as a global com-
mumty to handle the consequences. 
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